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ARE YOU A BOY OR A GIRL?
SHOW ME YOUR REAL ID
James McGrath*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 90s, I attended a performance of Hidden, a Gender, in which a
person appeared on stage and began talking about the internal conflict that
ensues when one sees another person and cannot determine if the person is
male or female.  The actor’s point was that it is very difficult to stop thinking
about a person’s gender until you finally make that determination.1  I almost
missed the point entirely, for at that moment my own mind was distracted by
trying to categorize the androgynous actor as either a man or a woman instead
of paying attention to the play.  I was caught in that tension of not being able to
categorize the actor into one of two discrete categories.  I was paralyzed by the
ambiguity.
Similarly, our nation is paralyzed by efforts to force human beings into
false binaries.  Although people generally tend to prefer dichotomous choices,
such as yes or no, black or white, boy or girl, not everything can be categorized
that easily.  Our efforts to oversimplify classification of certain human determi-
nants like sex still work for the majority of people, but have troubling effects
on people who do not fit neatly into one of the two categories of male or
female, and cause complications for others who do not conform to social roles
expected of them.  The law may be especially unkind to people who do not fit
into one of these two ill-defined variables.
An enormous body of literature reveals that gender may be, to a large
degree, a social construct.2  The public is also becoming more comfortable with
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1 This observation is not proposed to be novel.  “‘When you meet a human being,’ said
Freud in his comments on ‘Femininity’ in New Introductory Lectures, ‘the first distinction
you make is “male or female?” and you are accustomed to making the distinction with
unhesitating certainty.’” THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX:  BODY AND GENDER FROM THE
GREEKS TO FREUD 70 (1990).
2
“[W]hat gender ‘is,’ is always relative to the constructed relations in which it is deter-
mined.” JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:  FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY
15 (1999). See also Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution:  An Essay in
the Phenomenology and Feminist Theory, in PERFORMING FEMINISMS:  FEMINIST CRITICAL
THEORY AND THEATRE 270, 271, 273-74 (Sue-Ellen Case ed., 1990); David Collinson & Jeff
Hearn, Naming Men as Men:  Implications for Work, Organization and Management, in THE
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the idea that gender is not truly binary, as recent popular media parades a wide
range of gender diversity.  Although considerable literature has been devoted to
revealing that sex, sometimes called “biological sex,” is also not binary, most
people, and the law, believe all humans can be labeled as either male or female
under this rubric.3  Critics of these rigid categories and accompanying social
roles have examined the impossible task of organizing human beings into dis-
crete male/female binaries for medical and legal purposes.  Many now argue
that sex, like gender, may also be largely a socially constructed concept, and for
certain, is not truly binary.4
Throughout history, the development of more advanced scientific methods
to determine the inner workings of the human body has advanced our thinking
about what it means to be male or female.  Working at the genetic level, scien-
tists are now challenging assumptions that not long ago were thought to be the
zenith of knowledge about the development of a person’s sex.  With our
increased scientific knowledge of the human body comes more informed dis-
cussion about the social, medical, and legal ramifications of rigid constructs
about the rights of people based on their sex.
Authors have challenged the practice of identifying people by a static and
binary gender identifier when examining the rights of people who are trans-
gendered.  The plasticity of gender is fairly well recognized, but the presence of
intersex people reveals the impossibility of identification of all people into two
categories of sex,5 spurring some authors to call for removing a gender or sex
identifier on birth certificates.6  The intersex may be born with ambiguous gen-
italia, defying simple sex assignment.  Requiring a sex determination on a birth
certificate may also pressure parents to consent to immediate and unnecessary
surgery on infants whose sex is not clearly either male or female.  These chil-
MASCULINITIES READER 146-47 (Stephen M. Whitehead & Frank J. Barrett eds., 2001).
“Constructivism accepts the likelihood that social values continually evolve within the com-
plex system of legal, social, and scientific developments, as they are taken seriously within
these same disciplines.”  Keith H. Hirokawa, Dealing with Uncommon Ground:  The Place
of Social Constructivism in the Social Construction of Nature, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 392
(2003).  Hirokawa states:
Under social constructivism, what we perceive as reality is tainted by our preconceptions, such
as biases, assumptions, and ideas about how the world is supposed to be.  Constructivists further
note that these preconceptions are determined by the symbolic and linguistic practices that we
deem accepted, or acceptable, for purposes of interacting in a social setting.
Constructivists focus on the absence of a universally applicable, objective concept of
“nature.”
Id. at 391.
3 Although the words gender and sex often are used interchangeably, even in legal analyses,
most people associate gender with a person’s masculinity or femininity, while sex is con-
cerned with the physical anatomy of a person. See infra Part III.A.
4 See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female:  Intersexuality and the Collision
between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 271 n.25 (1999). See infra Part III.B
(discussing the science of sex).  Sex and gender are also distinguished more fully in Section
III.A.
5 See, e.g., Julie A. Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex Categories:  A Com-
parison of the Multiracial and Transgendered Experience, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917, 927
(2002).
6 See Elizabeth Reilly, Radical Tweak—Relocating the Power to Assign Sex, 12 CARDOZO
J.L. & GENDER 297, 299 (2005).
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dren may later discover that the surgery they underwent as an infant does not
coincide with the sex with which they now identify.  The inclusion of sex on a
birth certificate makes it virtually certain that each and every subsequent piece
of identification an individual will accumulate will include the same discordant
sex determination.  When a sex determination is made for an intersex infant
which proves to be discordant with their own sense of identity, a complex set of
legal hurdles make it difficult, and in many cases impossible, to change their
sex assignment on their original birth certificate or any or all of their subse-
quent official documents.
Although many official documents and forms of identification contain a
sex or gender identifier, gender, as a category on these documents, is not very
helpful in confirming a person’s identity.  If the purpose of the inclusion of
gender on official documents is to accurately identify an individual, technologi-
cal advances have given us more accurate methods of ensuring a person’s iden-
tity.  Technologies such as fingerprinting, facial recognition and retinal scans
are far superior methods of determining whether a person is who they claim to
be.  The use of gender or sex on identification cards does little to positively
identify individuals, and instead, creates problems for people who do not fall
neatly into either of the two currently accepted categories of sex or gender.
As a weak identifier, gender should not appear as a category on a state
issued driver’s license or official identification card, yet states no longer have
the authority to decide whether to require its inclusion.  The REAL ID Act of
2005 recently went into effect, establishing requirements for state issued identi-
fication cards and driver’s licenses.7  The REAL ID Act requires states to issue
driver’s licenses and identification cards that meet certain requirements to
ensure more accurate identification in the post 9/11 world.8  The nine minimum
requirements for information that states must provide on these cards include a
person’s gender.9
Although critics have attacked the REAL ID Act on many grounds as an
affront to civil liberties, as an unwelcome federal intrusion to a state’s police
powers, or as the dreaded creation of a national identification card,10 I argue
that the government should remove gender as a required identifier for two addi-
tional reasons.  First, by barring any state from removing gender or sex from
identification cards, the REAL ID Act prevents any state from removing these
categories in an effort to reduce the complications of inclusion that a gender
identifier inflicts on its gender variant citizens.11  Second, including a descrip-
tion of gender or sex is not an accurate method of identification, in no small
part because gender and sex are not fixed and may later change, so should not
7 See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 and 49 U.S.C.).
8 Id. § 202.
9 Id. § 202(b)(3).
10 See Patrick R. Thiessen, The REAL ID Act and Biometric Technology:  A Nightmare for
Citizens and the States That Have to Implement It, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 483,
489-92, 507 (2008) (noting that groups as politically diverse as the CATO Institute and the
ACLU have criticized the REAL ID Act as expensive and unwelcome intrusions on states’
powers); see also infra Part IV.
11 REAL ID Act § 202.
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be required under a federal law that ostensibly seeks to improve the accuracy of
identity cards.
This Article first examines the limits of legal classifications that view
human traits as dichotomous.  Next, it reviews the medical, scientific, and legal
problems created by imposing a binary of sex or gender and the resulting
problems this creates for many sexual minorities.  Finally, this Article exam-
ines the REAL ID Act’s requirement to include gender, critiquing its inclusion
as a poor identifier in light of current identification technology, and a problem-
atic or discriminatory identifier for certain sexual minorities.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RACE AS A FALSE BINARY IN THE LAW
Deciding whether someone is male or female is an analysis most people
feel competent to perform.12  Based on current mores and commonly held
understandings, perhaps confidence is warranted in the great majority of sex
determinations.  However, if we critically examine the limits of the terms
“male” and “female,” as well as our understanding of the assumptions that sup-
port these determinations, we see that these terms are fluid and dependent on
time, place, and evolving technology, with practical, social and political impli-
cations for our conclusions.13  Assuming sex is a binary creates a shaky foun-
dation for constructing a legal framework to determine a person’s rights.
Assuming a binary choice exists simplifies decision-making.  Similarly,
reducing complex variables into binaries facilitates decision-making and
enables bright-line legal distinctions.14  To this end, devices used to aid in com-
12 LAQUEUR, supra note 1, at 70.  As a general rule, people are confident with their ability to
determine a person’s sex, but on the rare occasion that a person’s sex is ambiguous, the
uncertainty creates a tension that almost demands resolution.  See, for example, Saturday
Night Live’s sketches of “Pat,” the ambiguous barber, later made into a motion picture enti-
tled IT’S PAT (Touchstone Pictures 1994).  In these sketches, people who meet Pat are
obsessed with determining Pat’s sex, with comic effect.  Julia Sweeney, who created the
role, also helped co-author a book to coincide with the film’s release, entitled It’s Pat!:  My
Life Exposed. JULIA SWEENEY & CHRISTINE ZANDER, IT’S PAT!:  MY LIFE EXPOSED (1992).
A few rock songs also discuss the tension when identification is not possible, such as Boy or
A Girl, by (appropriately) Imperial Drag, and Are You a Boy or Are You a Girl, by Jayne
County & The Electric Chairs. IMPERIAL DRAG, Boy or A Girl, on IMPERIAL DRAG (Work
1996); JAYNE COUNTY & THE ELECTRIC CHAIRS, Are You a Boy or Are You a Girl, on LET
YOUR BACKBONE SLIP (RPM Records 1995).
13 ALICE DOMURAT DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX 9
(1998).  Author Saru Matambanadzo discusses Dreger’s work.
The dichotomous sexual tradition constructs the Anglo-American legal landscape.  Histo-
rian Alice Domurat Dreger notes that many legal distinctions depend on there being two and
only two sexes.  In the past it determined who could own property, who could vote, and who
could legally engage in sexual intimacy.  Under the current legal regime, legal sex determines
many other aspects of one’s life including whom one can marry and whether one can be drafted
for military service.
Saru Matambanadzo, Engendering Sex:  Birth Certificates, Biology and the Body in Anglo
American Law, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 213, 213-14 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
14 Some more complex decisions may even be thought to be binary.  “For reasons which
appear to be obscure, decision-making is usually just assumed to be dichotomous.” PETER
EMERSON, THE DE BORDA INSTITUTE, FORUM SUBMISSION:  DECISION-MAKING IN EUROPE
AND IN IRELAND, http://www.forumoneurope.ie/getFile.asp?FC_ID=208&docID=963 (last
visited February 16, 2009).
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plex determinations, such as decision trees and computers, often reduce com-
plex schema into a chain of binary decisions.15  History is replete with
examples of forcing less than rigid categories into a tidy binary, often with
unjust results, and as will be discussed below, sex and gender are false
dichotomies.
Implementing more complex decision models may not promote consis-
tency in the law, which strives to attain predictable results for similar fact pat-
terns.  Often, it is politically and/or socially convenient to avoid recognizing
realities of deviance from established norms.  The law is an institution that
often reduces complex schema into binaries that may or may not be appropri-
ate, arguably to legitimize a cultural hegemony.16  Not just for the male and
female binary with regard to gender and sex, but also for other dichotomies,
such as citizen and non-citizen, and even race.17
Race was formerly legally constructed as a binary in the United States.18
Although discretely categorizing people by race has been challenged on social
and scientific grounds, there were certainly more than two recognized “races”
when United States law determined rights based upon two racial classifica-
tions.19  The problem of reducing the complex issue of race to a binary was
made fairly simple:  people were either white or non-white.20  Although this
appears to be a concrete distinction, issues arose as to how to categorize people
who were not one hundred percent white or non-white.  Various approaches
were developed to determine how much non-white blood in an otherwise
“white person” would shift their identity to non-white.  At the extreme was the
post civil war “one drop” rule:21  any amount of non-white blood would render
a person non-white.22  Other jurisdictions used a fractional approach, where
15 VICTOR H. VROOM & PHILIP W. YETTON, LEADERSHIP AND DECISION MAKING 41-42
(1973).
16 Other legal binaries are discussed infra Part II. See Ariela Gross, Essay, Beyond Black
and White:  Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 654 (2001)
(discussing academic debates concerning race, slavery, and resistance to cultural hegemony).
17 Race is also considered by many scholars to be a social construct. See Ian F. Haney
Lo´pez, The Social Construction of Race:  Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and
Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 61 (1994).
18 This topic is more fully examined in other works. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 5, at
923-27.
19 See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 195-97 (1922) (discussing the “African” race,
the “yellow race,” as well as American Indians and “white persons”).
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., Jason A. Gillmer, Suing for Freedom:  Interracial Sex, Slave Law, and Racial
Identity in the Post-Revolutionary and Antebellum South, 82 N.C. L. REV. 535, 593 n.365
(2004); Allyson D. Polsky, Blood, Race, and National Identity:  Scientific and Popular Dis-
courses, 23 J. MED. HUMAN. 171, 178 (2002). See also RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL
INTIMACY:  THE REGULATION OF RACE & ROMANCE 21 (2001) (stating that the one-drop rule
“defined as black any person with traceable African ancestry”).
22 Application of the one-drop rule had the effect of a racial binary with further conse-
quences.  For example, Virginia adopted an apology resolution, discussing, inter alia,
[T]he Racial Integrity Act of 1924 which institutionalized the “one drop rule,” required racial
description of every person to be recorded at birth and banned interracial marriages, effectively
rendering Native Americans with African ancestry extinct, and these policies have destroyed the
ability of many of Virginia’s indigenous people to prove continuous existence in order to gain
federal recognition and the benefits such recognition confers.
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one-fourth, one-eighth, or one-sixteenth of a person’s lineage from a non-white
predecessor would render a person non-white.23  It is interesting to note that
although earlier laws for determining a person’s status as a slave or free person
was often made according to the person’s visible appearance, the ultimate
determination was a different binary; a person born of a mother who was a
slave would also be a slave.24
Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44
CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 9 n.38 (2007) (quoting S.J. Res. 332, 2007 Sess. (Va. 2007)).
23 In a footnote to his article, Professor Troutt reviews the diversity of such laws through a
fairly descriptive account of various sources. See David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window:
Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1124 n.60
(2008).  The footnote provides as follows:
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (“It is true that the question of the propor-
tion of colored blood necessary to constitute a colored person . . . is one upon which there is a
difference of opinion in the different states . . . . But these are questions to be determined under
the laws of each state, and are not properly put in issue in this case.  Under the allegations of his
petition, it may undoubtedly become a question of importance whether, under the laws of Louisi-
ana, the petitioner belongs to the white or colored race.”); Lee v. New Orleans Great N. R.R.
Co., 51 So. 182 ([La.] 1910) (suggesting that “persons of color” included persons with as little as
one-sixteenth African ancestry); see also TED GIOIA, THE HISTORY OF JAZZ 34 (1997) (“[T]he
most decisive turning point was the passage of the Louisiana Legislative Code of 1894 that
designated that anyone of African ancestry was a Negro.”); CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY
CASE:  A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 153-54 (1987) (“Determination of race was
wholly impossible to be made . . . by any tribunal, much less by the conductor of a train . . . . In
addition, neither federal nor Louisiana law had defined the limits of race [and] . . . under the
Louisiana separate car law the determination depended on the conductor’s arbitrary judgment.”);
Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule:  Racial Categories, African Ameri-
cans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1178 n.72 (1997) (“Louisiana did not statuto-
rily define Blackness [but] did adopt via its Supreme Court an ‘appreciable mixture of negro
blood’ standard.”); Orville Lee, Legal Weapons for the Weak?  Democratizing the Force of
Words in an Uncivil Society, 26 L[AW][ ] & SOC. INQUIRY 847, 8[84] (2001) (citing VIRGINIA
R. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION:  SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA 2 (1986))
(referring to “a 1970 Louisiana statute that made 1/32 ‘Negro blood’ the dividing line between
white and black”); Daniel J. Sharfstein, [Essay,] The Secret History of Race in the United States,
112 YALE L.J. 1473, 1507 (2003) (“After the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that anyone of
traceable African origin was ‘colored,’ that state’s Bureau of Vital Statistics assumed an equally
powerful role in maintaining the racial order.”).
Id.
24 For example,
The rule in Kentucky was that a person visibly appearing to be white, or a person of less than a
fourth of African blood, was presumed free.  The presumption, however, could be rebutted “by
some evidence showing or legitimately tending to show, that, notwithstanding her apparently
white skin, she had some African taint, and was, de jure, a slave.”  White skin thus was “but
prima facie” evidence of freedom, which could be defeated with proof that a person “descended
from a mother who was a slave.”
Gillmer, supra note 21, at 610-11 (footnotes omitted).  Gillmer noted that the rules for deter-
mining a person of mixed blood status as slave or non-slave were not static and evolved as
the political climate changed, discussing, as an example, a Virginia law related to the “rule
that the children would follow the condition of the mother”:
“Whereas some doubts have arisen whether children got by any Englishman upon a negro
woman should be slave or ffree [sic], Be it therefore enacted and declared by this present grand
assembly, that all children borne in this country shalbe [sic] held bond or free only according to
the condition of the mother.”
Id. at 560 n.145 (quoting II HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE:  BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL
THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1615, at
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After emancipation formally outlawed slavery, Jim Crow laws maintained
legal distinctions based on a person’s skin color to discriminate on the basis of
whether a person was white or non-white.25  Despite social and scientific
advances that should have led the law to abolish legal distinctions, the law
lagged significantly behind the social and scientific recognition of the equality
of human beings.  Laws still in effect in the 1950s in Arkansas and Louisiana
required labeling of all blood donated to ensure that no white person received
the wrong color blood.26
Other legal efforts to keep whites distinct from non-whites included anti-
miscegenation laws.  Until 1967, laws making it a criminal offense27 for people
to marry a partner of another “race” were still in effect in some states.  Such
laws were deemed unconstitutional in the landmark case of Loving v. Vir-
ginia.28  Virginia’s laws prohibited whites from marrying persons who were
not white, resulting in a true dichotomy of race for the purpose of anti-miscege-
nation.29  To accomplish this goal of maintaining the race binary, Virginia law
collapsed two diverse racial groups, “colored persons and Indians,” into a sin-
gle class.30
Other areas of the law have forced race into a binary with some tortured
use of language.  For example, United States citizenship laws at one time
26 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823)).  For an interesting analysis comparing people of
mixed African and white ancestry pre-civil war and the contemporary issue of who is a man
(or a woman) for intersexual persons, see Marie-Ame´lie George, The Modern Mulatto:  A
Comparative Analysis of the Social and Legal Positions of Mulattoes in the Antebellum
South and the Intersex in Contemporary America, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 665 (2006).
25 Reginald C. Oh, A Critical Linguistic Analysis of Equal Protection Doctrine:  Are Whites
a Suspect Class?, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 583, 594 (2004).
26 JOE CONASON & GENE LYONS, THE HUNTING OF THE PRESIDENT: THE TEN-YEAR CAM-
PAIGN TO DESTROY BILL AND HILLARY CLINTON 69 (2000).  There was concern that white
people receiving blood from non-whites would render them also non-white.  This is actually
a generous recitation of their concerns. See Polsky, supra note 21, at 178.
27 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967) (“Section 20-59 [of the Virginia Code],
which defines the penalty for miscegenation, provides:  ‘Punishment for marriage.—‘If any
white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry with a
white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the
penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.’”) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
59 (1960 Repl. Vol.) (repealed 1968)).
28 In Loving, the Court noted:
The Lovings were convicted of violating § 20-58 of the Virginia Code:
“Leaving State to evade law.–If any white person and colored person shall go out of this
State, for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of
it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as
provided in § 20-59, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been
solemnized in this State.”
Id. at 4 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 (1960 Repl. Vol.) (repealed 1968)).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 4-5 (“Other central provisions in the Virginia statutory scheme are § 20-57, which
automatically voids all marriages between ‘a white person and a colored person’ without any
judicial proceeding, and §§ 20-54 and 1-14 which, respectively, define ‘white persons’ and
‘colored persons and Indians’ for purposes of the statutory prohibitions.”) (footnotes
omitted).
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required a person seeking naturalization be “white.”31  This, again, was an
effort to distinguish people by skin color into dichotomous variables of white
and non-white.32  Challenges to efforts to limit immigration based on skin color
are most striking in two Supreme Court cases, decided one year apart in the
early twentieth century.  In Ozawa v. United States,33 a Japanese man seeking
naturalization challenged his denial of citizenship based on the fact that he was
not “white,” as required by statute.34
Ozawa argued his skin color was whiter than many European immigrants
who were eligible for naturalization.35  The United States Supreme Court noted
that, although the immigration statutes indeed used the term “white,” the clear
intent of Congress was to include people of the Caucasian “race.”36  Mr.
Ozawa was denied citizenship because he was deemed “non-Caucasian,” and
therefore, non-white.37  The immigration statutes permitted naturalization of
“free white persons,” a term the Court conceded was likely intended to differ-
entiate African and (American) Indians, without contemplating the rights of the
“brown or yellow races of Asia.”38  The Court found that Congress had likely
intended not to exclude other races of people, but had only intended to include
white people in the class of people eligible for naturalization, keeping the
binary of race intact.39
About a year later, in United States v. Thind,40 the Court ruled on a case in
which the Naturalization Examiner for the United States sought to revoke the
naturalization of a previously naturalized citizen, based upon his skin color.41
Thind relied heavily on the Ozawa ruling that the term “Caucasian” was synon-
ymous with “white.”42  As a man from India, he was included in the “race” of
31 Section 2169 of the Revised Statutes, 8 U.S.C.A. § 359, provided that the provisions of
“this title” applied to aliens who were “free white persons.” See Ozawa v. United States,
260 U.S. 178, 192 (1922).  In Ozawa, the Supreme Court explained:
Exactly the same words are used to introduce the similar provisions contained in § 2165 of the
Revised Statutes.  In 1790 the first Naturalization Act provided that, “Any alien, being a free
white person, . . . may be admitted to become a citizen, . . .”  C. 3, 1 Stat. 103.  This was
subsequently enlarged to include aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent.
These provisions were restated in the Revised Statutes, so that § 2165 included only the procedu-
ral portion, while the substantive parts were carried into a separate section (2169) and the words
“An alien” substituted for the words “Any alien.”
Id.
32 This topic is more deeply examined in other works. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 5, at
923-27.
33 Ozawa, 260 U.S. 178.
34 Id. at 192.
35 Id. at 185. See also Deenesh Sohoni, Unsuitable Suitors:  Anti-Miscegenation Laws,
Naturalization Laws, and the Construction of Asian Identities, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 587,
605 (2007) (reviewing the facts of Ozawa, in a discussion of the construction of an Asian
identity in United States law).
36 Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 195.
37 Id. at 198.
38 Id. at 195.
39 Id. at 195-96.
40 United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
41 Id. at 207.
42 Id. at 208.
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people known as Caucasian,43 but presented with a fairly deep brown skin
color.44  The Court referred to its prior decision in Ozawa, but noted, “the con-
clusion that the phrase ‘white persons’ and the word ‘Caucasian’ are synony-
mous does not end the matter.”45  Although there was discussion of whether
Mr. Thind was truly a member of the Caucasian race, the Court returned to
Congress’ intent when writing the statute, backtracking a bit on the narrowing
of the term “white” as meaning “Caucasian.”46  The Court found that Con-
gress’ likely meaning of the word “white” excluded Mr. Thind from
citizenship.47
Although state and federal agencies collect data on a person’s race, laws
that restricted a person’s rights based on race have largely disappeared.  The
laws were designed to discriminate based on a person’s race, but defining race
made their application difficult and contentious.  People did not fit neatly into
two categories, so some people were able to avoid the harsh, exclusionary
effect of the laws by “passing” as white.  Recognizing that people should all be
treated equally under the law, regardless of the color of their skin, seems obvi-
ous today, but integration of schools and public accommodations brought vio-
lent opposition in the 1950s and 1960s.  Race never was a binary, but reliance
on outdated “scientific” concepts of race supported protection of the white
hegemony.
Similar to race, the limitations of binary distinctions dependent upon a
person’s gender or sex are evident when examining the rights and duties of
people who do not neatly fall into categories of either male or female.48
Although it is widely accepted that gender is a social construct,49 the rigid
categorization of people into two sexes has not been constant historically, and
recent developments in medicine and science support the argument that sex is
also socially constructed.50  The law has relied upon these terms as binary in
their application, resulting in unfair, and sometimes inconsistent, results.
Adopting a more modern understanding of the concepts of gender and sex
43 Arguably, at least as the Court distinguished between “scientific” and popular meanings
of the word “Caucasian.” Id. at 208-09.
44 Id. at 212 n.4.
45 Id. at 208.
46 The Court distinguishes between a layperson’s likely interpretation of the word “Cauca-
sian,” as opposed to that of an ethnologist. Id. at 214-15.
47 This is a bit of editorializing on my part, because, as noted above, the Court did not think
of the law as exclusionary:
[T]he provision is not that any particular class of persons shall be excluded, but it is, in effect,
that only white persons shall be included within the privilege of the statute.  “The intention was
to confer the privilege of citizenship upon that class of persons whom the fathers knew as white,
and to deny it to all who could not be so classified.”
Id. at 207 (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 195 (1922)).  The distinction is
largely lost on this author.
48 Perhaps not just our laws, but to avoid the collapse of society.  “[T]he possession of a
[single] sex [as male or female] is a necessity of our social order, for hermaphrodites as well
as for normal subjects.”  Alice Domurat Dreger, A History of Intersexuality:  From the Age
of Gonads to the Age of Consent, 9 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 345, 346 (1998).
49 See supra note 2.
50 See infra Part III.E.
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would make future legislation and court determinations more reflective of the
needs of all citizens, including those of sexual minorities.
III. CHALLENGING THE BINARY OF SEX
Transsexuals, who live, or seek to live, their lives as the opposite sex to
which they were assigned at birth, directly challenge the male-female gender
distinction as both binary, and as immutable.51  Others who are also trans-
gender may similarly challenge gender norms, but may not have the same
problems in proving their identities for myriad purposes, such as obtaining
driver’s licenses and receiving public aid, as they may be living alternatively as
either gender, with documentation that does not conflict with their public pres-
entation.52  In addition, intersexual persons may not present clearly as either
gender.53  Although in some legal analyses it proves unimportant, as many peo-
ple make no distinction between the terms in practice, and others use them
synonymously, an examination of the differences between the terms “gender”
and “sex” is still appropriate.
A. Gender as Compared to Sex
The great diversity in gender expression has been examined in many con-
texts, culminating in recent scholarship that views gender as a social con-
struct.54  What it means to be male or female is fluid, and is affected by
geographic and temporal contexts.55  Although we often use the terms sex and
gender synonymously, “sex” is often distinguished as designating a person as
either male or female, based upon sexual anatomy and physical determinations,
51 Elaine Craig, Trans-Phobia and the Relational Production of Gender, 18 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 139-40 (2007).
52 The terms “transgender” and “transsexual” are defined differently in various sources.  I
am adopting a fairly common definition by implementing the term “transgender” to include
many different groups of people who do not necessarily conform with gender norms, such as
transvestites, drag kings and queens, and transsexuals.  However, transsexuals may consider
themselves not as people desiring to change their gender, but people who are actually con-
forming or seeking to conform with the gender identity they believe is correct for them,
though not assigned to them at birth.  The San Francisco Human Rights Commission used a
similar definition:
[T]he term ‘transgender’ is used as an umbrella term that includes male and female cross dress-
ers, transvestites, female and male impersonators, pre-operative and post-operative transsexuals,
and transsexuals who choose not to have genital reconstruction, and all persons whose perceived
gender or anatomic sex may conflict with their gender expression, such as masculine-appearing
women and feminine-appearing men.
Sonia Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 135 n.194 (2002) (quoting
James D. Wilets, Conceptualizing Private Violence Against Sexual Minorities as Gendered
Violence:  An International and Comparative Law Perspective, 60 ALB. L. REV. 989, [990]
n.1 (1997)).
53 The intersex are sometimes considered transgendered. See supra Part I.
54 See Carolyn E. Coffey, Battling Gender Orthodoxy:  Prohibiting Discrimination on the
Basis of Gender Identity and Expression in the Courts and in the Legislatures, 7 N.Y. CITY
L. REV. 161, 162 (2004).
55 Male and female “roles” vary in geographic and temporal contexts.  Think of the role of
women in Victorian England as compared to women in present day United States. DREGER,
supra note 13, at 9.
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and considered to be an immutable determination, as opposed to “gender,”
which is seen as more malleable and socially constructed.56
What society deems culturally “feminine” and culturally “masculine” is therefore
premised on a “stereotype,” a social determination regarding which gender prefer-
ences or characteristics are conventionally associated with biological males and
females.  These culturally assigned characteristics and preferences encompass every-
thing from “physical appearance to clothing and self-presentation, to personality and
attitude, . . . to patterns of speech and behavior.”57
Along with other scholars, I argue that efforts to divide all people into one
of two genders or sexes result in forced and artificial categories.  This is espe-
cially true when we recognize advances in our understanding of scientific
concepts that have far outpaced the law’s evolution.58  Not only techno-
logical advances, but definitions of what is male or female also vary as soci-
ety adopts different mores, evolving in response to those technological
advances and exposure to other cultures.  Consider the practice of associ-
ating certain colors for girls or boys; as late as the turn of the nineteenth
century, pink was associated with boys, and blue for girls.59  The formerly mas-
culine
56 Jason Allen, A Quest for Acceptance:  The Real ID Act and the Need for Comprehensive
Gender Recognition Legislation in the United States, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 169, 172
(2008).
57 Monica Diggs Mange, The Formal Equality Theory in Practice:  The Inability of Current
Antidiscrimination Law to Protect Conventional and Unconventional Persons, 16 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2007) (citing to, inter alia, Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender
from Sex and Sexual Orientation:  The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminine Jurispru-
dence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (1995)) (footnotes omitted).  Mange further quotes Professor
Case as follows:
Gender in our culture is marked by differences in voice (femininity is associated with high-
pitched voices, at best soft-spoken, at worst shrill; masculine voices are louder and deeper);
gesture (femininity is associated with grace, gentleness, tentativeness, and deference; masculinity
is physically more bold, aggressive, and decisive; it takes up more space in a room); clothing and
personal appearance (femininity is associated with pastel or bright colors, above all with shades
of pink, with frills, ruffles, and soft fabrics, with skirts and dresses.  Masculinity is more drab
and practical:  its paradigm may still be the gray flannel suit; it generally is free of ornaments
such as jewelry, makeup, and long or elaborate hairstyles).
Id. at 3-4 (quoting Case, supra, at 20-21).
58 Note, for example, Professor Greenberg’s comment that because many of the biological
determinants of sex can now be changed through hormonal therapy or surgery, sex is now
socially constructed, while sexual identity remains fixed.  Greenberg, supra note 4, at 271
n.25.  More on this topic, infra Part III.D.
59 Professor Jennifer Nye offers the following insight:
Despite the idea that gender is fixed, we are continually creating and recreating our gender
through our words, actions, dress, and relationships. Femininity and masculinity are not fixed
concepts; the conceptual boundaries of femininity and masculinity shift as society shifts.  The
concept of gender changes from one historical period to another.  A feature considered feminine
in one time period or culture may not be considered feminine in a later time period or different
culture.  For example, at the turn of the century, boys wore pink and girls wore blue.  Today,
pink is the “girl” color and blue is the “boy” color.  While what is considered masculine and
feminine may change, the idea that they are two polar, mutually exclusive categories remains
constant.
Jennifer L. Nye, The Gender Box, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 226, 230 (1998) (footnotes
omitted).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-2\NVJ204.txt unknown Seq: 12 21-MAY-09 10:29
Winter 2009] ARE YOU A BOY OR A GIRL? 379
color pink is now undeniably associated as feminine in the United
States.60
The word “gender” is often used synonymously with “sex” in the law.
Notably, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg used the terms interchangeably in her
briefs to the Supreme Court and in her practice before and on the Court.61  In
her arguments in sex discrimination cases, Justice Ginsburg’s secretary sug-
gested that she use the word gender in the place of the word sex because the
word sex made her appear too harsh.62  However, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B.,63 Justice Scalia made an effort to distinguish the terms, recognizing the
cultural underpinnings and fluidity of the word gender.64
Although the concepts of gender and sex are not truly interchangeable, for
many sexual minorities, the legal results do not usually change, regardless of
the term used in analyzing their rights.  Gender’s fluidity has become better
understood by people in general, as the popular media has been increasingly
willing to display, with diminishing derision, women who are more masculine
and men who are more feminine (than what has been considered “typical”).65
Transsexuals, transvestites, drag queens and drag kings have also stepped out
of the shadows in mainstream movies and television.
Although much of the public may have accepted the fact that gender is
fairly fluid, the public still largely believes sex to be a dichotomous and immu-
60 In a former life, I built and managed a small nightclub.  Although I would now character-
ize it as a social experiment, for entertainment purposes, I painted the men’s bathroom pink,
and the women’s bathroom blue.  Men would dash out quickly after seeing the pink color,
and recheck the signage.  Employees would assure them that it was the men’s bathroom,
often having to point out that the room was equipped with a urinal.
61 See Case, supra note 57, at 9-10.
62 See id. at 10 (“‘For impressionable minds the word “sex” may conjure up improper
images’ of what occurs in porno theaters.”) (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the
Supreme Court:  The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 n.1).  Professor Case
goes on to discuss Ginsburg’s work as follows:
Therefore, she
stopped talking about sex discrimination years ago. . . . [S]he explained that a secretary
once told her, “I’m typing all these briefs and articles for you and the word sex, sex, sex, is
on every page.  Don’t you know those nine men [on the Supreme Court], they hear that
word and their first association is not the way you want them to be thinking?  Why don’t
you use the word ‘gender’?  It is a grammatical term and it will ward off distracting
associations.
Id. (quoting Ernie Freda, Washington in Brief:  Clinton’s Old Underwear Full of Tax Holes,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 29, 1993, at A8).
63 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
64 Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion, noted:
Throughout this opinion, I shall refer to the issue as sex discrimination rather than (as the Court
does) gender discrimination.  The word “gender” has acquired the new and useful connotation of
cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the
sexes.  That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine to male.  The
present case does not involve peremptory strikes exercised on the basis of femininity or mascu-
linity (as far as it appears, effeminate men did not survive the prosecution’s peremptories).  The
case involves, therefore, sex discrimination plain and simple.
Id. at 157 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65 Susan Frelich Appleton, Contesting Gender in Popular Culture and Family Law:  Mid-
dlesex and Other Transgender Tales, 80 IND. L.J. 391, 393-95 (2005).
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table variable.66  This expression of male or female is considered determinative
and fixed, whether or not corresponding with a person’s presenting gender.
People who are intersex or transgender likely have difficulties in the law under
this assumption.  Although the great majority of people appear to fall fairly
neatly into one “sex,” and usually the corresponding “gender,” the exceptions
demand reexamination of the societal function of the binary categorization of
people.
Intersexual people are concrete, physical proof of the fallacy of binary sex
distinctions, and recognizing them and other less well-known variations in
expression in the human physical form show the failure of our laws that enforce
rigid dichotomies of people by sex.  Neither medicine nor the law provides a
consistent or workable definition of what it means to be male or female.67
B. Medically Determining Sex68
Medical science does not have a single definition of sex, causing confu-
sion in situations when a person’s sex is not obvious.  Scientific discoveries
have helped to shape our concept of our place in the world, our place in the
animal kingdom, and, as we have unlocked many former secrets of the human
body, what it means to be male or female.69  Although scientific evidence may
be considered the last word on proof of a person’s sex, the science of sex has
66 For example, “[t]he distinction along sex rather than gender lines can be seen as impre-
cise and even misleading because sex is a dichotomous variable while gender is generally
viewed as a continuous variable.”  Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect
Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence,
91 GEO. L.J. 67, 140 n.220 (2002) (citing Kay Deaux & Marianne LaFrance, Gender, in 1
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 788, 789 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed.
1998)).
67 ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY 3 (2000).  Many authors and activists note
consistent reinforcement of the gender/sex binary with the use of male and female pronouns,
he or she. Id. at 31.  Some offer alternative pronouns, “ze” & “hir.” See John M. Ohle,
Note, Constructing the Trannie:  Transgender People and the Law, 8 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 237, 239 (2004).  Dean Spade prefers to use
the gender-neutral pronouns “sie” (pronounced “see”) and “hir” (pronounced “here”) to promote
the recognition of such pronouns, which resist the need to categorize all subjects neatly into male
and female categories, at the suggestion of Leslie Feinberg.  [He] use[s] these pronouns when
discussing a hypothetical person, but when [he is] referring to people who have articulated a self-
identification in a particular gender, [he] respect[s] that choice by using pronouns which reflect
it.
Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 17
n.7 (2003) (citing LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANS LIBERATION:  BEYOND PINK OR BLUE 1 (1998)).
68 The science of sex is complicated and constantly evolving.  The following discussion
focuses heavily on the groundbreaking work of Professor Julie Greenberg who introduced
these scientific concepts to legal literature in Defining Male and Female:  Intersexuality and
the Collision Between Law and Biology.  Greenberg, supra note 4, at 279-80.  I have
included some recent discoveries, but cannot improve on Professor Greenberg’s thorough
examination.
69 For example, since germ theory was embraced, we no longer believe that many maladies
are the result of humor imbalances, excessive blood, bad morals or demonic possession.
Kelli K. Garcia, The Fat Fight:  The Risks and Consequences of the Federal Government’s
Failing Public Health Campaign, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 529, 552 (2007).  In a 1909 listing
of causes of death, one category included “visitation of God.”  Andrew Pollack, Redefining
Disease, Genes and All, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2008, at F1.
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not been static, but rather, constantly evolves, and does not always provide a
definitive answer.70  In medicine, technological advances shape our concepts of
disease and expand our knowledge of the workings of the human body.  For
example, in the nineteenth century, the invention of the stethoscope made it
possible to link symptoms of coughing up blood, shortness of breath, as well as
fifteen other symptoms, with a single disease, tuberculosis.71  The science of
classifying disease, known as nosology, continues to evolve with today’s
advances at the genetic level,72 unlocking former mysteries of the human body.
No longer a mystery, but not widely known, an embryo of either a typical
male or female is formed with bi-potentiality for expression as either sex.73  An
embryo develops as a typical male, or female, depending upon the presence or
absence of certain genes, enzymes, and hormones.74  At about the eighth week
of development, sex differentiation begins to occur.75  With a phenotypic XY
assignment, an embryo typically begins to develop as a boy; with a phenotypic
XX assignment, a girl.76  In the absence of certain hormones, an embryo will
develop into a typical female.77  In the presence of masculinizing genes and
hormones, the embryo would likely become a typical male.78  Usually, these
events occur in alignment with the chromosomes, but some XX males have an
X chromosome containing the gene that triggers the masculinizing process and
release of hormones, resulting in a masculine appearing child.79  Similarly,
there are apparent females who have an XY chromosomal assignment.80
Other chromosomal assignment variations also occur, such as X without
an accompanying X or Y, known as “X0,” as well as XXX, XXY, XXXY,
XYY, XYYY, XYYYY.81  Some of these variations may result in the creation
of typical males or females, but some will not.82  Most people “know” that a
person with an XX chromosome assignment is a female, and a person with an
XY chromosome assignment is a male; however, chromosomal assignment is
but one of the factors that medicine uses to determine a person’s sex.  Accord-
70 See infra discussion of sex Part III.E.
71
“The advent of the stethoscope made it possible to unify tuberculosis.”  Pollack, supra
note 69.
72 See, e.g., Jamie A. Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law:  Redefining Public
Health, 93 CAL. L. REV. 171, 174-76 (2005).
73 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 279-80.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 279.
76 Id. at 279-80.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Although this is a great oversimplification of the process, and much is still not known of
the process.  Interview with Eric Vilain, MD, PhD, Assistant Professor of Human Genetics,
Rediscovering Biology, Unit 11:  Biology of Sex and Gender, Expert Interview Transcripts,
www.learner.org/channel/courses/biology/units/gender/experts/vilain.html (last visited Feb.
16, 2009) [hereinafter Interview with Eric Vilain].
80 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 281 (citing ROBERT POOL, EVE’S RIB:  SEARCHING FOR THE
BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF SEX DIFFERENCES [EVE’S RIB:  THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF SEX DIF-
FERENCES]  70-71 (1994)).
81 Id.
82 See infra Part III.C (discussing intersex).
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ing to Dr. David R. Brown, a Minneapolis-based pediatric endocrinologist who
specializes in growth and intersex disorders,
Biology is not as definitive as we like to believe.  And neither is gender.  There is not
100 percent continuity for any of us.  For example, if you were to remove one of my
gonads and subject it to microscopic analysis, you would find ovarian elements.  And
every single cell in my body may not be XY.  I could have some XX, a few XXY.83
Previously, it was believed that an embryo would default to becoming a
female if the mechanisms involved to virilize the embryo did not occur.84
Recent discoveries reveal there are also genes that trigger the development of a
typical female, challenging the former male-centric view of sex development.85
So, contrary to what we may have learned in high school, chromosomes
are not the end of the discussion in determining the sex of an individual.
Although most people’s chromosomal assignments align with their appearance
and gender self-identification, diversity occurs in the physical appearance of
people within either an XX or XY chromosomal assignment.86  There are eight
or nine well recognized medical determinants of sex:  genetic (or chromo-
somal) sex; gonadal sex (reproductive sex glands - testes and ovaries); internal
morphologic sex (seminal vesicles, prostate, vagina, uterus, fallopian tubes);
external morphologic sex (genitalia); hormonal sex; phenotypic sex (secondary
sexual features such as facial hair or breasts); assigned sex and gender of rear-
ing; and, gender identity.87  The ninth factor often considered is the set of
neurobiological determinants, sometimes referred to as “brain sex,” that may
play a role in determining a person’s sex.88  Recently, many researchers assert
that, in spite of all the other biological factors, the brain itself may be predis-
posed to typical male or female gender tendencies.89  This predisposition could
be due to a physical structuring of the brain, perhaps due to the effect of mascu-
linizing hormones on the brain, although scientists have not yet proven this
theory.90  Some gender variance may be thought of as a matter of personal
choice, but recognition of hormonal differences in the brain creates questions of
neurobiology, not just psychology, or a matter of the division of “mind and
body.”91
83 Ann M. Bauer, What is a Doctor to Do When a Parent Asks, “Is My Child a Boy or a
Girl,” and the Answer Lies Somewhere in Between?, REDORBIT, June 2, 2005, http://www.
redorbit.com/news/health/153258/the_second_question/.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 281-84.
87 Id.
88 Technological advances in techniques in PET scans and MRIs permit scientists to film
differences occurring while a subject thinks and processes information, revealing differences
in typical male and female brains.  Linda Marsa, He Thinks, She Thinks, DISCOVER, July 5,
2007, http://discovermagazine.com/2007/brain/she-thinks.  Dr. Vilain examines “masculin-
ized” or “feminized” brain differences, while noting that these terms are based on societal
stereotypes of expected behavior for males and females. See Interview with Eric Vilain,
supra note 79.
89 See Interview with Eric Vilain, supra note 79.
90 Id.
91 In no way do I mean to diminish the importance of the psychological factors involved,
but this is further evidence, in my mind, of the fallacy of the mind/body distinction. See Noa
Ben-Asher, Paradoxes of Health and Equality:  When a Boy Becomes a Girl, 16 YALE J.L.
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When all of these factors in determining sex do not all align in the usual
manner, the result may be the development of bodies that are not easily termed
male or female.92  People whose bodies are made up of a mixture of typical
male and female determinants may be labeled intersex, depending on the
expression of the differences, and the definition of intersex.
C. Intersex
1. What is Intersex?
People who are born with indeterminate genitalia, and others with sex
characteristics that are not all congruous, may be labeled “intersex.”93  For-
merly called “hermaphrodites” (and often still labeled as such),94 intersexual
persons defy dichotomous assignment of sex in many varied expressions of the
human body.  Some of the more common expressions of intersex include con-
genital adrenal hyperplasia, androgen insensitivity syndrome, Turner’s syn-
drome, Kleinfelter’s syndrome, gonadal dysgenesis, and hypospadias.95  Below
is a brief description of these common forms of intersex, revealing the seem-
ingly limitless possibilities for variation of the human physical form.
• Congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) is one of the most common
forms of intersex in children with an XX chromosome assignment.96
Although these children may be virilized, and may appear to be male,
many of them have the potential to be a fertile female as an adult.97
CAH is not a discrete condition, as many different forms of CAH are
caused by malfunctioning enzymes involved in producing steroid hor-
mones.98  Some forms of CAH may be life threatening and require treat-
ment to save the life of the infant.99
& FEMINISM 275, 290-99 (2004).  Nor am I personally concerned whether gender expression
is biological or chosen, but these recent developments may erode arguments that some gen-
der behavior is simply a choice.
92 The question of how rare is controversial, and is discussed infra Part III.C.2.
93 As Dr. Brown proposes,
The most common occurrence is a baby born with a phallic structure that is larger and longer
than a clitoris, but not quite a fully developed penis, with a urethra that runs along its base.  But
along with that you may have minimal or no fusion of the labial-scrotal folds—in other words, a
typical ‘female’ vagina.  This can look very alarming.
Bauer, supra note 83.
94 Hermaphrodites are mythical beings, possessing the reproductive traits of both males and
females.  The term was used to describe intersexual persons in medicine, distinguishing
pseudo hermaphrodites from “true hermaphrodites,” those who had gonads of both sexes.
DREGER, supra note 13, at 29-31.
95 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 51-53.  Others claim that conditions such as
Klinefelter’s Syndrome, Turner Syndrome, and late-onset congenital adrenal hyperplasia are
not conditions of intersex. See, e.g., Teresa A. Zakaria, Note, By Any Other Name:  Defining
Male and Female in Marriage Statutes, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 349, 358 (2005) (citing Leo-
nard Sax, How Common is Intersex?  A Response to Anne Fausto-Sterling, 39 J. SEX. RES.
174, 175-77 (2002)).
96 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 59.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 58.
99 Id. at 52.  As set forth by Erin Lloyd, “the only intersex condition known to require
immediate medical attention is the ‘salt-wasting’ or ‘salt-losing’ category of congenital adre-
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• Androgen insensitivity syndrome is a condition that affects children
with an XY chromosome assignment.100  These children are born with
feminized genitalia due to their cells’ inability to bind to testosterone.101
As a result, the virilizing process does not take place as it does with
typical XY infants.102  Children with androgen insensitivity develop a
feminine body shape, with a narrow waist, little or no body hair and
developed breasts.103  These children present as typical females, so phy-
sicians may not diagnose the condition until puberty when their patients
fail to menstruate.104  Children with partial androgen insensitivity syn-
drome may also present with varying degrees of typical male or female
genitalia, often ambiguous, depending on the degree of the child’s abil-
ity to utilize the masculinizing hormones.105
• Turner’s syndrome is caused by the lack of a second chromosome in an
infant, resulting in an X0 (an X with no other) chromosome assign-
ment.106  Although they do not have an XX chromosome assignment,
persons with Turner’s syndrome appear similar to be typical females.107
However, their ovaries do not develop, they are likely to be physically
short, and they do not usually develop secondary sex characteristics.108
Their gonads are also unformed, with no complete testes or ovaries,
indicating that in-utero, there was insignificant exposure to male or
female hormones to aid in their development.109
• Klinefelter’s syndrome results from a person with an XY chromosome
assignment having an extra X chromosome, resulting in an XXY chro-
mosome assignment.110  Klinefelter’s syndrome causes infertility in oth-
erwise male appearing children, who often experience breast
enlargement after puberty.111  As a result, physicians do not usually
diagnose this condition until puberty.112  Also, the testes, and sometimes
the penis of these persons, are smaller that typical males.113
nal hyperplasia (CAH).  Indeed, genital surgery is not a response to the dangerous medical
concerns—which are treated with hormones—but a cosmetic response to atypical genitalia.”
Erin Lloyd, From the Hospital to the Courtroom:  A Statutory Proposal for Recognizing and
Protecting the Legal Rights of Intersex Children, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 155, 173
(2005).
100 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 52.
101 Id.
102 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 286.
103 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 52.  Consider the case of Mary Patin˜o, an athlete
with CAH who was denied a chance to compete at the 1968 Olympics. Id. at 1-2.  See infra
Part III.E.2.
104 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 286.
105 Id. at 287.
106 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 52.
107 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 284.
108 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 52.
109 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 284.
110 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 52.
111 Id.
112 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 283.
113 Id.
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• Other types of intersexuality include gonadal dsygenesis,114 considered
a kind of “catch all” term used for genetic irregularities that produce
gonads that do not develop properly.115  Children with gonadal dygensis
often have an XY chromosome assignment but lack the masculinizing
hormones that produce typical male development.116
• Hypospadias is a condition in which the urethra does not run to the tip
of the penis.117  This condition is not likely to be considered an intersex
condition, except in its more extreme forms.118  Hypospadias may be
very mild, with the urethral opening just below the tip of the penis, a
somewhat common form,119 or it may open along the shaft, with the
most severe cases resulting in an opening at the base.120
There are many other scientific possibilities for human beings to develop
in a form that does not adhere to a sex binary.  New examples are being discov-
ered in large part due to technological advances enabling exploration at the
genetic level.  A recent discovery of twins, who shared one hundred percent of
their mother’s genetic material, would appear to indicate that they were
monozygotic, or identical twins.121  However, the two infants received separate
genetic contributions from their father.122  This could have occurred from a
division of the ovum after fertilization by two separate spermatozoa, or by an
ovum splitting into two and being fertilized after that split.123  The single cell
with two separate genetic contributions in this case resulted in two children:  a
phenotypical male, and another child born with ambiguous genitalia, who the
physicians labeled a “true hermaphrodite.”124  The proportion of XX to XY
cells within the twins varied between them in general, and also within the type
of tissue examined,125 resulting in the decision to raise the twin with ambigu-
ous genitalia as a girl.126
There are other variations which may or may not be labeled intersex that
challenge the sex binary, and some conditions may change during a child’s
lifetime.  For example, there are a significant number of children born in vil-
lages in the Dominican Republic who are chromosomally XY, with embryonic
114 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 52.
115 Id.
116 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 284.  In this form, the condition is known as Swyer Syn-
drome. Id.
117 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 52.
118 See id. at 57-58.
119 Id. at 52.  Not considered a form of intersex, as compared to the “ideal penis” in a study
of non-intersex men, about forty-five percent of men had a mild form of hypospadias. Id. at
57.
120 Id. at 52.
121 See Vivian Souter, et al., A Case of True Hermaphroditism Reveals an Unusual Mecha-
nism of Twinning, 121 HUM. GENETICS 179, 179 (2006).
122 Id. at 182.
123 Id. at 183-84.  The less precise language used is mine to avoid making this article even
less readable.
124 Id. at 179.
125 Id. at 181-83.
126 Anne Casselman, Semi-Identical Twins Discovered, DISCOVER, Jan. 2008, at 64.
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testes, yet possess external female genitalia at birth.127  These children are
raised as females until puberty, when their voices change as their testes descend
and their clitorises become penises.128  After this transformation, they live as
males.129
People with any of the above conditions of intersex may appear as what
we would consider typical males or females, while others will have an appear-
ance difficult to categorize.  Although a small number of people have sexual
determinants that are not in alignment, it is clear that medical sex is not truly a
binary.  The wide variety of expression of intersex also makes it difficult to
reach consensus on the incidence of intersex individuals.
2. Incidence of Intersex
Incidence of intersexual persons is dependent upon the definition of inter-
sex.  Noting this difficulty, the Intersex Society of North America answers the
frequently asked question on its website,
If you ask experts at medical centers how often a child is born so noticeably atypical
in terms of genitalia that a specialist in sex differentiation is called in, the number
comes out to about 1 in 1500 to 1 in 2000 births.  But a lot more people than that are
born with subtler forms of sex anatomy variations, some of which won’t show up
until later in life.130
Some experts estimate as high as four percent of the population are inter-
sex, “while others would fix it as low as one half of one percent.”131
Professor Anne Fausto-Sterling, a biologist, estimates that if intersex is
defined as “an individual who deviates from the Platonic ideal of physical
dimorphism at the chromosomal, genital, or hormonal levels,”132 approxi-
mately 1.7 percent of the population would be defined as intersex.133  Professor
Francisco Valdes claims, “genital anomalies occur in [two] or [three] of every
[one-hundred] births, and approximately four million Americans ‘have genita-
lia that are neither or both male or female, but are sex assigned either male or
female.’”134  More conservative incidence estimations omitting Turner’s and
127 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 276.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Intersex Soc’y of N. Am., How Common is Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/faq/fre-
quency (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).  The website then reprints Anne Fausto-Sterling’s table
of a comprehensive list of conditions that would result in a much higher incidence rate, noted
below. Id.
131 Greenberg, supra note 5, at 927.
132 Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic are We?  Review and Synthesis, 12
AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 161 (2000), quoted in Sara R. Benson, Hacking the Gender
Binary Myth:  Recognizing Fundamental Rights for the Intersexed, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GEN-
DER 31, 33 (2005).
133 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 51-53.
134 Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys:  Deconstructing the Conflation
of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 20 n.46 (1995) (quoting LAUREL [ ] RICHARDSON, THE DYNAMICS OF SEX AND
GENDER:  A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 5 (3d ed. 1988)).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-2\NVJ204.txt unknown Seq: 20 21-MAY-09 10:29
Winter 2009] ARE YOU A BOY OR A GIRL? 387
Klinefelter’s syndromes and other conditions as intersex would result in a
decrease to nearly one-one hundredth of Sterling’s estimate.135
Other variables include geographic concentrations, such as the villages in
the Dominican Republic, discussed above.136  The actual number is unimpor-
tant because the point is to highlight the incredible variety of physical expres-
sion of the traits considered to be either male or female.  Authors defending the
strict binaries prefer to report the incidence as low as possible, labeling intersex
as aberrations to the “normal” ordering.137
3. Historic Medical Treatment of Intersexual Persons
The medical treatment of intersex persons has evolved as the genesis of
these conditions are discovered.  Social changes eventually follow, and the law
may follow, or lead, societal movements.138  Although current clinical practice
appears to favor the size of phallus as determinative of a person’s sex,139 this
has not always been the case.  The sciences of medicine and anatomy continue
to evolve as knowledge of the body increases and technology enhances to
unlock the secrets of the human body.
Twelfth-century theological and medical writings characterized sex as
continuous, as opposed to binary.140  Early scientific consensus on the nature of
the human body found there to be only one sex, expressed in a perfect form, the
male body, and in a less perfect inverted form as a female.141  “Scientific”
support for this early belief appeared at its zenith with the publication of anat-
omy texts of the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries.142  The vagina was
described as a hollow and inverted penis,143 the ovaries as the female inverted
expression of testicles.144  Females were considered to possess the same repro-
135 Sax, supra note 95, at 177, cited in Karen Gurney, Sex and The Surgeon’s Knife:  The
Family Court’s Dilemma . . . Informed Consent and the Specter of Iatrogenic Harm to Chil-
dren with Intersex Characteristics, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 625, 629 n.31 (2007).
136 See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
137 Normal being defined as “‘that which functions in accordance with its design.’”  Ken-
neth J. Zucker, Intersexuality and Gender Identity Differentiation, 10 ANN. REV. SEX. RES.
1, n.1 (1999), quoted in Zakaria, supra note 95, at 359 n.44.  These arguments appear to
merely reinforce the current normative paradigm.  Labeling differences pejoratively assumes
that the person who is different is damaged and the “normal” person is not, legitimizes the
desire to try to make the different person conform.  Sharon E. Preves, Sexing the Intersexed:
An Analysis of Sociocultural Responses to Intersexuality, 27 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE
& SOC’Y 523, 525 (2002).
138 Often the law lags significantly behind social changes, such as the end of the anti-sod-
omy laws by and through the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas. See generally
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  At the time, there was almost no routine prosecu-
tion of sodomy laws. Id. at 569.  At other times, the law pushes the boundaries of society,
such as with the abolition of slavery, or the outlawing of separate but equal treatment of
people based on their skin color. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
139 Discussed infra text accompanying notes 164-67.
140 Preves, supra note 137, at 535.
141 LAQUEUR, supra note 1, at 124.
142 Laqueur tracks the development of medicine and anatomic science during this period.
See generally id. chs. 3-5.
143 Id. at 79.
144 Id. at 80-81.
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ductive system as males, yet “turned inside out” to form that of a female, result-
ing in one sex, expressed in two genders.145
As scientists have continued to unlock the mysteries of the human body,
scientific efforts to categorize intersexual persons into one sex or the other have
taken many different approaches.  A former standard for determining the sex of
a person was to base it upon their reproductive organs, or “gonads,” considered
at one time to be the essence of one’s gender.146  The presence of ovaries con-
firmed a girl; testes, a boy.147  This level of sophistication was only possible
after science had unlocked the differences in these tissue types.  Later, discov-
ery of mixed organs, “ovotestes,” further confused the issue of binary identifi-
cation using gonads as the primary identifier.148
It is difficult to unpack the normative understanding of sex, so the pres-
ence of typical “male” or “female” genitalia is still largely the ultimate standard
used in determining the sex of a person.  An example of this bias is evident in a
study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1987, in which Dr. David
Page was attempting to establish the discovery of “the master gene,” a specific
sequence on the Y chromosome.149  Dr. Page hypothesized that he had located
the gene responsible for the development of all sexual characteristics.150  Dr.
Page examined a pool of individuals that included what he termed to be XX
“males” and XY “females.”151  Although trying to obviate a definition based on
genitalia, he apparently based the genetic determination as male or female on
their external genital appearance.152  It is difficult to discuss the variety of
expression without referring to these commonly accepted terms.
Dr. Eric Vilain, a noted expert on intersex, suggests that when discussing
“brain sex,” we avoid using terms such as “masculinizined brain,” as it is “what
society perceives as masculinized vs. feminized.”153  “There are a number of
behaviors that are stereotypic for males and some others [that are] stereotypic
for females, which we call ‘gender role behavior.’”154
Treatment of intersexual persons has varied historically depending not
only upon current scientific knowledge, but also on prevailing social and politi-
cal norms.  For example, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in France,
there were many varying written opinions and interpretations of the nature of
hermaphroditism, which later researchers believed were fueled by concerns
over “transvestitism, sodomy (especially between women), and the possible
transgression of other social sex roles.”155
145 Id. at 134-35.
146 Referred to by Dreger and others as the “Age of Gonads,” between c. 1870-1915. DRE-
GER, supra note 13, at 29.
147 Id.
148 Ovotestis, “a sex gland containing both ovarian and testicular tissue,” were discovered in
the early twentieth century. Id. at 73.
149 BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 2, at 136.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 136-38.
153 Interview with Eric Vilain, supra note 79.
154 Id.
155 DREGER, supra note 13, at 33.
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An early societal concern about intersexual persons was that they would
marry a person of the same sex, resulting in a homosexual marriage.156  People
who grew up as a female might later be discovered to be a male, or vice versa,
after puberty had changed the appearance of their genitals.  Sometimes these
discoveries occurred well into adulthood, and after many years of marriage.157
People previously believed to be males sometimes began menstruating later in
life; others considered females, experienced their testes descending.158  In addi-
tion to the usual religious and normative arguments still used in the present day
to justify intolerance toward same sex marriage, earlier arguments included
concern over the slowing of the birth rate and maintaining a sufficient popula-
tion base.159
At the end of the nineteenth century, persons of indeterminate sex may
have appeared as troubling aberrations to the proper ordering of society, chal-
lenging established sex-roles by failing to conform to the binary of sex.  Many
of the rights of people in a social, political and legal context were dependent
upon a person’s sex, treating women as second-class (or worse) citizens.160
One reason for an unwillingness to recognize gender variance was to support
subjugation of women.161  Alice Domurat Dreger noted it would be disruptive
to setting the proper role for women in society if it were impossible to define
exactly what a woman was.162  Two French physicians writing on the subject
of hermaphrodites in 1911 noted, “the possession of a [single] sex is a necessity
of our social order, for hermaphrodites as well as for normal subjects.”163
It is still the rule to attempt to categorize every infant born as either male
or female.164  In common modern clinical practice for intersex, for “genetic
males” (XY), determinations of their sex are largely based upon the adequacy
of their penis; in “genetic females” (XX), intervention is largely based upon
preservation of reproductive capacity.165  Although no single accepted defini-
tion of male or female exists, sex is generally assigned at birth based upon the
appearance of an infant’s genitals, as determined by the birth attendant.166
That immediate determination of sex is then noted on the infant’s birth
certificate.167
156 Id. at 119.
157 See generally id. ch. 4 (“Hermaphrodites in Love”).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 119.
160 See infra Part III.E.1.
161 DREGER, supra note 13, at 27-28.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 30 (citing Th. Tuffier & A. Lapointe, “L’Hermaphrodisme.  Ses variete´s et ses
conse´quences pour la pratique me´dicale (d’apre`s un cas personnel),” 17 REVUE DE GYN ´ECO-
LOGIE ET DE CHIRURGIE ABDOMINALE 256 (1911)).  Note too that the ISNA recommends
assigning a child of indeterminate sex a gender for rearing.
164 See infra Part IV.A-B (discussing birth certificates).
165 Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change:  A Struggle for Intersex and Transsex
Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51, 61 (2006) (citing Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Evalua-
tion of the Newborn with Developmental Anomalies of the External Genitalia, 106 PEDIAT-
RICS 138, 141 (2000)).
166 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 271.
167 Id.
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D. Surgical Treatment to Change or Define Sex
One troubling question for a child born with unusual genitalia is whether
their phallus is a large clitoris or a small penis (often termed micro-penis).  The
average size of a typical newborn typical female’s clitoris is 0.345 centimeters,
with a range of about 0.2 to 0.85 centimeters.168  A typical newborn male’s
penis ranges between 2.9 and 4.5 centimeters in length.169  Phalluses that fall
between the maximum “acceptable” clitoris size and below the minimum
“acceptable” penis size may make an infant a candidate for surgery to conform
to certain societal expectations for the use of a penis.170
In determining the adequacy of an infant’s penis, criteria include the
appearance of the genitals, the potential ability of a male to urinate while stand-
ing, and the potential for sexual penetration with the penis.171  It has been noted
the phallus size of a baby at birth has not been reliably correlated with the size
and function of the phallus at the age of puberty.172  Surgery to “correct” these
“unacceptably sized” phalluses is likely to result in surgical assignment as a
female, based upon the difficulty in recreating the male genitalia.173  One sur-
geon was quoted as joking, “you can make a hole but you can’t build a
pole.”174  Early surgical efforts in “normalizing surgery,” surgery that would
turn a baby with a micro-penis into a girl, or reduce an oversized clitoris, did
not attempt to preserve clitoral sensitivity.175  Since the 1960s, however, surgi-
cal procedures have developed to make preservation of sensitivity more
likely.176  Additional surgery beyond the reduction of the phallus may be
needed to complete the sex assignment, depending on the child’s anatomy.177
Noa Ben-Asher traced the intertwined histories of intersex and transsexual
surgeries in the United States as “connected to the concept of a gendered inner-
self that appeared in the second half of the twentieth century to explain sex
behavior through a theory of immutable gender identity.”178  From this, people
assumed that an adult’s psychological “sex” was fixed, unlike the bodies of
transsexuals, which could be altered surgically, beginning after World War
II.179  Securing surgery to alter their bodies can be a difficult process for
transsexual persons.  Surgery for infants with ambiguous genitalia is now con-
troversial, as many of these children may later regret irreversible decisions
made for them without their input.  A more modern, patient-based approach is
to delay surgery on their genitalia until the child can participate in any surgical
decisions.180
168 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 60.
169 Id. at 57.
170 Id. at 57-60.
171 Id. at 57.
172 Id. at 58.
173 Id. at 58-59.
174 Id. at 59.
175 Following the connection of clitoral stimulation with female orgasm. Id. at 61.
176 Id.
177 Including creation of labia, etc. Id.
178 Ben-Asher, supra note 165, at 78.
179 Id.
180 See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
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Transsexual persons seeking sexual reassignment surgery learn early that
there are rules they must comply with to make themselves eligible for the sur-
gery they desire.  To be eligible for sexual reassignment surgery, they usually
must follow the Benjamin Standards of Care Protocol,181 which include seek-
ing counseling, obtaining psychiatric approval for the surgery, and living for
one year in the intended gender before surgery.182  Professor Dean Spade, an
openly transsexual law professor, recalled his frustration attempting to prove to
counselors proving that he was a “real” transsexual when seeking the treatment
he desired.183  He described having to meet certain expectations that he knew
his counselor would require him to exhibit to prove that he was a real transsex-
ual.184  “‘What if it means I’m not “real”?’  Even though I don’t believe in real,
it matters if other people see me as real.  If not, I’m a mutilator, an imitator, and
worst of all, I can’t access surgery.”185  The counselor Professor Spade referred
to eventually decided that he was not “real” enough to recommend for sexual
reassignment surgery.186  At support groups, Professor Spade learned that,
often, people seeking treatment learn “what it means to lie and cheat their way
through the medical roadblocks to get the opportunity to occupy their bodies in
the way they want.”187  People seeking treatment need to “perform a desire for
gender normativity,” at least feign adherence to a sex binary, and admit that
they have a mental disorder, in order to qualify for medical assistance in getting
the treatment they desire.188
The difficulty for transsexuals in securing the treatment they desire is
strikingly similar to earlier instances of people seeking to be recognized as the
sex that they knew was their own.  In the late nineteenth century, before the
181 Although there are other standards of care, this is the predominant standard.  Charles
Thomas Little, Comment, Transsexuals and the Family Medical Leave Act, 24 J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 315, 322-23 (2006).  Harry Benjamin was a physician who worked
with transsexuals, facilitating some of the first medical transitions from one sex to the other.
Alvin Lee, Trans Models in Prison:  The Medicalization of Gender Identity and the Eighth
Amendment Right to Sex Reassignment Therapy, 31 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 447, 452 (2007).
“In 1979, physicians, therapists, and researchers who worked with transsexuals formed a
professional organization called the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Associ-
ation (HBIGDA).  The members gave official standardized criteria for diagnosis and treat-
ment.”  Ben-Asher, supra note 165, at 79.  Under the Benjamin standards of care, a
transsexual who desires hormone therapy or breast surgery must be diagnosed as suffering
from gender identity disorder and provide a letter of recommendation from a mental health
care provider.  Little, supra, at 323.  To qualify for sexual reassignment surgery for their
genitals under the Benjamin standards of care, transsexuals must be diagnosed as suffering
from gender identity disorder, and provide two letters, one from a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist (PhD), the other may be from a therapist with a master’s degree. Id.  The
transsexual must also live in the role of the desired gender for at least three months before
receiving hormonal therapy, and for one year if surgery is desired. Id.
182 Kristin R. Rowland, Note, Amorphous Employment Discrimination Protection for
Transsexuals: Doe v. Boeing, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 367, 369 (1995).
183 Professor Spade was also the founder of the Sylvia Rivera Legal Clinic, and has written
extensively on gender and transsexual issues.  Spade, supra note 67, at 19-20.
184 Id. at 19.
185 Id. at 20.
186 Id. at 22.
187 Id. at 23.
188 Id. at 24. See also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 532-38 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing Gender Identity Disorder).
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development of sexual reassignment surgeries, people seeking to live their lives
in their desired sex had to convince gatekeepers that they were indeed already
that sex.189  These gatekeepers could be physicians or courts attempting to cate-
gorize a person of ambiguous sex.190  While assessing a patient with “doubtful
sex,” a French physician cautioned his students about placing too much empha-
sis on patient testimony about their behaviors, noting that:
every individual who wishes to be declared a man tells me . . . that he has a very
pronounced taste for all the exercises of the body, gymnastics, arms, horse-riding,
that he has a very broad intelligence and above all special aptitude for math–I ask
myself if this is peculiar to hermaphrodites!–In a word, the statements are so exag-
gerated that I dare not take them completely into account. . . .191
Unlike the difficulty for many transsexuals to secure the surgery they
desire, intersexual infants are often surgically altered before they are of an age
to consent.192  Many adults who have undergone surgery as a child to “correct”
conditions of intersex have later been unhappy with their surgical reassign-
ments and advocate for personal control over their bodies, and for infants who
may be subject to such surgeries.193  Although gender is malleable, there
appears to be biological determinants of the extent of its elasticity.  In the
1950s, clinicians developed recommendations for surgery and hormonal treat-
ment of intersex infants that remained unchallenged for decades.194
One of the most famous experts of the era, Dr. John Money, and his col-
leagues postulated that biological factors were not the sole factors of gender
development, and that gender socialization of an intersex infant with a defini-
tive physical sex assignment before the child reaches eighteen months of age,
coupled with unambiguous child rearing, would result in “normal” gender iden-
tity development.195  In a famous case testing his theory, Dr. Money attempted
to change the sex of a child who was not in any way considered intersex.196
One child of a set of identical twins had lost his penis when he was eight
months old “when a doctor used an electrocautery needle, instead of a scalpel,
to excise his foreskin during a routine circumcision, burning off his entire
penis. . . .”197  Not surprisingly, his parents immediately canceled his brother’s
operation.198  The injured twin, David Reimer, who was raised until that time
as a boy, was a chromosomally and hormonally typical boy.199  Dr. Money
189 DREGER, supra note 13, at 90-91 (citing Brouardel, “Hermaphrodisme; impuissance;
type infantile,” 60 GAZETE DES H ˆOPITAUX CIVILS ET MILITAIRES 57 (1887)).
190 See infra Part III.E (concerning historic legal determinations of sex or gender).
191 See supra note 13, at 90-91.
192 See, e.g., Ben-Asher, supra note 165, at 61-62.
193 Id.
194 Preves, supra note 137, at 527 (2002) (citing John Money et al., Hermaphroditism:
Recommendations concerning Assignment of Sex, Change of Sex, and Psychological Man-
agement, 97 BULL. OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL 284-300 (1955)).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 527-28.  Often dubbed the “Joan/John case.” Id.
197 John Colapinto, Gender Gap:  What Were the Real Reasons behind David Reimer’s
Suicide?, SLATE, June 3, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2101678/.  Colapinto authored a
biography about David. See JOHN COLAPINTO, AS NATURE MADE HIM:  THE BOY WHO WAS
RAISED AS A GIRL (2000).
198 Preves, supra note 137, at 527.
199 Id.
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advised David’s parents that he be “reassigned” as a female, because without a
penis, he would to be unable to develop as a normal male.200
David’s case was widely cited in medical and social science literature as
proof that gender was indeed socially malleable.201  Both the medical and pop-
ular media hailed the transformation as a complete success.202  Later, it was
revealed that David was never satisfied being female, and rebelled against his
assigned gender role almost from the beginning.203  He began the process of
male reassignment at the age of fourteen, when he learned of his early medical
history.204  He underwent a double mastectomy and a phalloplasty as part of his
transformation back to a physical male.205  His later doctors postulated that
David’s case was evidence of at least some degree of biological determinism,
which supports modern theories of the effects of gender specific hormones on
the brain.206  Although David eventually married and adopted the children of
his wife, his life was never a very happy one, and he eventually committed
suicide.207
Many persons born intersex never knew; others knew, but thought they
were unique.  When Professor Anna Fausto-Sterling began publishing articles
in The Sciences and The New York Times, more people became aware of the
existence of intersex.  The Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) was
founded as a support group, but later became an educational and activist group
for the rights of intersex persons.208  ISNA opposes early surgical intervention
for intersex infants, both advocating and litigating to curb the practice, relying
on the rights of autonomy and self-determination found in international human
rights law, as well as the tort of battery.209
The Convention on the Rights of the Child is a principal legal source for
opponents to early genital surgeries.210  Almost all nations have ratified the
Convention, with the exception of the United States and Somalia.211  There is
now significant legal and social opposition to the practice of “corrective” sur-
gery on intersex infants in the United States.  Among other reasons, early geni-
tal surgeries occur without the intersex person’s informed consent, which
200 Id. at 527-28.
201 Sharon E. Preves, Out of the O.R. and into the Streets:  Exploring the Impact of Intersex
Media Activism, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 247, 273-74 (2005).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 274.
204 Preves, supra note 137, at 528.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See Colapinto, supra note 197.
208 See Intersex Soc’y of N. Am., What’s the History Behind the Intersex Rights Move-
ment?, http://www.isna.org/faq/history (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
209 Ben-Asher, supra note 165, at 62 (citing Convention of the Rights of the Child, G.A.
Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989)).
210 Id.  Professor Hazel Beh, a law professor, and Milton Diamond, a physician, also
explore the ethical concerns about surgery on the intersex as infants.  See Hazel Glenn Beh
& Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma:  Should Physicians Per-
form Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 MICH.  J. GENDER &
L. 1 (2000).
211 Ben-Asher, supra note 165, at 63.
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cannot occur while he or she is still an infant.212  Performing surgery before the
child can have a voice in the decision is seen as unnecessary to protect the
interests of the child.  Activists against these early surgeries have noted that
there are not many occasions where a child will have to prove their sex until
puberty, at which point they may have to prove it for issuance of a driver’s
license.213  The modern approach is to raise an intersex child as one gender, but
forego surgery until the child is of an age to help determine his or her “true”
sex.214
E. Evolution of Rules for Determining Sex
Historically, determining a person with ambiguous genitalia’s sex was left
to the legal system.  Until the early nineteenth century, lawyers and judges
usually decided intersexual persons’ statuses, sometimes with medical consul-
tation.215  Early in the twentieth century, the task of determining one’s sex
more often fell to physicians.216  In the United States, a number of standards
are used to determine a person’s legal sex, varying by jurisdiction and for dif-
fering legal purposes, ranging from the
procreative (a man must be able to fertilize ovum and beget offspring, while a
woman must be able to produce ova and bear offspring), to the religious ([sex or]
gender is immutably fixed by our Creator at birth), to the scientific ([sex or] gender
itself is a fact that may be established by medical and other evidence).217
1. English Common Law Approaches to Determining Sex
Although the current approach to determining sex enforces a sex binary,
this concept has not been constant through history.  English law previously
divided people into three sexes:  male, female, and hermaphrodites.218
Hermaphrodites were then further subdivided into male or female, depending
212 Unless, of course the surgery is needed to protect the physical well being of the child.
As Jo Bird proposes,
The law determines which bodies are allowed to exist without surgical intervention and
legitimates the alteration of the hormonal, anatomical and endocrinological features of those
whose bodies are designated to be abnormal.  The intersex body is deemed to be biologically
anomalous at the same time it is deemed to be legally anomalous.  There is no such thing as the
purely biological body unmediated by law.  Such profound physical alterations to children’s
bodies under any other circumstance would be regarded as discriminatory treatment—contrary to
the rights of the child—or as violent criminal assaults.
Jo Bird, Outside the Law:  Intersex, Medicine and the Discourse of Rights, 12 CARDOZO J.L.
& GENDER 65, 67-68 (2005).
213 Reilly, supra note 6, at 316.
214 See Beh & Diamond, supra note 210, at 26; Intersex Soc’y of N. Am., What does ISNA
Recommend for Children with Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/faq/patient-centered (last vis-
ited Feb. 16, 2009).  Remember, one of the determinants is self-identification.  Greenberg,
supra note 4, at 270.
215 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 40.
216 Id.
217 Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can’t Take it With You:  Constitutional
Consequences of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L. REV. 819, 819 (2005).
218 Matambanadzo, supra note 13, at 239 (citing 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS
OF ENGLAND 31 (Samuel Thorne trans., 1968-1977), available at http://hlsl5.law.harvard.
edu/bracton/Unframed/English/v2/19.htm).
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upon the “predominance of their sexual organs.”219  Under the common law,
hermaphrodites were considered both female and male.220  This did not mean
that they were free to choose to vacillate between the sexes, but rather, were
expected to choose one sex and live in that role permanently.221  So, even
though recognized as different, an intersexual person’s rights were determined
by whether their genitalia was more like that of a typical man or woman.222
Distinguishing men from women has had differing legal functions at vari-
ous times in history.  Women were denied the right to own property, conduct
business, enter into contracts, to sue, to receive equal pay for employment, to
equal access to public education, to various employment opportunities, to
vote,223 and even to the right to speak in public.224  In many cases, the determi-
nation of an intersexual person as either male or female might have also
decided the passage of one’s fortune through the laws of intestacy.225
2. Determining Legal Sex in the United States
In 1843, an election in Salisbury, Connecticut, came down to one vote to
determine the winner.226  Levi Suydam, a person of indeterminate sex, peti-
tioned the town selectmen for the right to vote, a right that, at the time, was
available to men only.227  The selectmen subjected Levi to an examination by a
physician who pronounced him male.228  Apparently, the physician based his
examination on the appearance of Levi’s genitals, as it was later discovered that
Levi also menstruated regularly and possessed a vaginal opening.229  Physical
inspection of genitalia was likely the extent of the law’s ability to distinguish
sex in 1847 Connecticut.
219 Id.
220 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 277-78.
221 Matambanadzo, supra note 13, at 240.
222 Professor Greenberg notes:
In the 16th century, Lord Coke, the renowned jurist, writing about the laws of succession to
hereditary wealth and title in England declared, “Every heire is either a male, or female, or an
hermaphrodite, that is both male and female.  And an hermaphrodite (which is also called Andro-
gynus) shall be heire, either as male or female, according to that kind of the sexe which doth
prevaile.”
Greenberg, supra note 4, at 277-78.
223 Terrance R. Kelly, Canaanites, Catholics and the Constitution:  Developing Church
Doctrine, Secular Law and Women Priests, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 3, 67 (2005).
224 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 39.
225 Under the law of intestate succession in the seventeenth-century New England colonies,
each child received an equal portion of the family’s real estate, with the exception of the
eldest son, who received a double portion.  “In contemporary England the principle of pri-
mogeniture guided intestate succession of land, and so the eldest son inherited all of a fam-
ily’s real property.”  Richard Cole, Authentic Democracy:  Endowing Citizens with a Human
Right in Their Genetic Information, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1241, 1296 n.228 (2005) (citing
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985)).
226 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 30.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
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More recently in the United States, determining a person’s legal sex has
been based on a person’s physical appearance, chromosomes, self-identifica-
tion, or perhaps a combination of one or more of these factors.230
Determining the legal sex of a person has often been critical in assessing
the rights of transsexuals in marriage, where the decision will affect the validity
of the union and resulting property claims.  Currently in the United States, a
female transsexual is legally a woman in about half of the states, and a man in
the other half.231  In 1999, the Texas Court of Appeals decided in Littleton v.
Prang232 that the marriage between a man and Christie, a female transsexual
who had undergone sexual reassignment surgery, was void, as she was still a
man, and Texas law does not permit same-sex marriages.233  Based on this
determination, the law would not recognize Christie as a surviving spouse in a
wrongful-death suit.234  The court asked, “[C]an a physician change the gender
of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a person’s gender immu-
tably fixed by our Creator at birth?”235  The court considered medical testi-
mony and other court rulings and decided, “[t]here are some things we cannot
will into being.  They just are.”236  The court speculated that Christie was born
with an XY chromosome assignment, and that, despite her surgical and hormo-
nal treatments, that fact was not going to change, nor would her legal sex.237  In
Texas, Christie was still a man, and the marriage was void.
In M.T. v. J.T,238 a New Jersey case with the opposite result, the court
ruled that the biology of sex is not permanently determined at birth.239  The
230 For a review of the approaches of various states, see Julie A. Greenberg, When is a
Same-Sex Marriage Legal?  Full Faith and Credit and Sex Determination, 38 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 289, 292 (2005).
231 Greenberg & Herald, supra note 217, at 823-24.
232 Littleton v. Prang, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
233 Id. at 230-31.  Interestingly, this ruling permits a different kind of same-sex marriage in
Texas.  Phyllis Frye and Alyson Meiselman, two transgender lawyers, discussed the after-
math of the Littleton decision:
As an unintended result of the Fourth Court’s ruling that voided the straight-appearing,
opposite-sex-appearing, heterosexual-appearing marriage of Mrs. Littleton, some same-sex-
appearing marriages within the jurisdiction of the Fourth Court became legal.  For example, on
September 16, 2000, Ms. Jessica Wicks and Ms. Robin Manhart Wicks were legally married in
San Antonio, Texas.  Jessica’s original birth certificate read “boy” and Robin’s original birth
certificate read “female.”  These women shared vows, exchanged rings, and were blessed by a
Minister of God in a private ceremony before about fifty friends and supporters.  Their marriage
was similar to Christie Lee and Jonathan Mark Littleton’s opposite-sex marriage, except that
they were two women getting legally married.  Despite what one conservative lawmaker said,
this couple passed the “duck test.”  Less than two weeks later, two more women obtained a
marriage license.  Other same-sex couples have been invited to wed.  Even amateur chess players
should have seen these couples coming as the political result of the Littleton decision.
Phyllis Randolph Frye & Alyson Dodi Meiselman, Same-Sex Marriages Have Existed
Legally in the United States for a Long Time Now, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1031, 1033-34 (2001)
(footnotes omitted).
234 Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
235 Id. at 224.
236 Id. at 231.
237 Id. at 230-31.
238 M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
239 Id. at 211.
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court took note of the decision in the English case of Corbett v. Corbett,240 in
which a transsexual was determined not to have changed her sex, despite hav-
ing undergone sexual reassignment surgery.241  In Corbett, the court developed
a test that required congruence of the chromosomal, gonadal, and genital sex
characteristics.242  The court in M.T. refused to follow Corbett’s reasoning,
noting that appearance of the genitalia is an accepted proof of sex in certain
sports, service in the military, and for certain employment.243  The M.T. court
noted that, under Corbett, sex is fixed at birth, but recognized the great dishar-
mony in a preoperative transsexual’s physical appearance and gender iden-
tity.244  Following surgery for sex reassignment, the M.T. court ruled that,
when “gender and genitalia are no longer discordant,” a court may consider a
transsexual his or her reassigned sex for purposes of marriage.245
Another legal issue for transgender and transsexual persons includes laws
concerning separate bathrooms for each sex in the workplace.246  Professor
Terry Kogan argues that requiring separate toilet facilities in the workplace was
part of an effort by Victorian regulators to continue to separate women and
reinstate the morals and ideology of the nineteenth century.247  Professor
Kogan notes, if otherwise unable to force women back into the home, “the law
would mandate that spaces in the dangerous public realm be set aside . . . as
protective havens for women, as surrogate ‘homes away from home.’”248
Laws separating the sexes in bathrooms are problematic for transgender and
transsexual persons.  People whose gender appearance is somewhat variant
might be perceived as using the wrong bathroom, resulting in social and legal
complications.249
3. Determining Sex for Participation in the Olympics
Although not a legal determination, in the world of professional sports, the
standard for determining who is male or female has changed over the years,
though in a different manner.  Appearance of an athlete’s external genitalia was
formerly the standard for establishing a person’s sex for participating in sport-
ing events, such as the Olympics.250  Although the International Olympic Com-
mittee (IOC) rules require proof of a female’s sex,251 there has only been one
known case of a man competing as a woman in the Olympics.  In 1936, Her-
240 Corbett v. Corbett, 2 W.L.R. 1306 (P.D.A. 1970).
241 M.T., 355 A.2d at 208 (citing Corbett, 2 W.L.R. at 1323).
242 See id. (citing Corbett, 2 W.L.R. at 1325).
243 Id. at 208-09.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 211.
246 Terry S. Kogan, Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms:  Law, Architecture, and Gender,
14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 7 (2007).
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Spade, supra note 67, at 17 & n.5.  Spade recalls his own horrific experience of being
arrested and jailed for nearly a day for using a toilet in Grand Central Station. Id. at 17 n.5.
250 Ostensibly, to ensure fair play and equality. See Haley K. Olsen-Acre, The Use of Drug
Testing to Police Sex and Gender in the Olympic Games, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 207,
216-17 (2006).
251 Athletes competing as males are not tested to ensure that they are not females. See id. at
212.
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mann Ratjen of Germany “bound up his genitals and took part in the women’s
high jump competition,” finishing fourth behind three women.252  More
recently, athletic organizations have been using a chromosomal test instead,253
though it has not proved to be a more definitive test.
Consider the case of Mary Patin˜o, a professional hurdler who arrived to
compete in the 1988 Olympics without the requisite proof from a physician that
she was female.254  The IOC was prepared for this occurrence and told her to
report to an on-site clinic for a simple buccal mucosa (inside the cheek) scrape
test.255  Her first test determined that she was not a woman.256  A second test
confirmed the first troubling result, finding that she possessed not only XY
chromosomes, but also testes within her body, though no uterus or ovaries.257
The committee decided that, based on these findings, she was not a woman, and
therefore, was ineligible to compete.258  Her prior sports awards were taken
from her by the respective sports’ committees that had originally awarded her
prizes and titles.259  After a two and a half year legal challenge, she was rein-
stated in a professional athletics federation, and rejoined the Spanish Olympic
squad after she proved herself “feminine enough to compete.”260
The buccal mucosa scrape test was used by the IOC until 1992, when it
was replaced by another test utilizing a DNA polymerase chain reaction.261  To
accommodate all athletes, many experts advocate further changes to profes-
sional sports rules to accommodate our greater understanding of sex and
gender.262
IV. IDENTIFICATION
A. The REAL ID Act
The REAL ID Act of 2005 was a part of the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and the Tsunami
Relief Act, all part of Congress’ efforts to protect the United States from terror-
ist attacks.263  The REAL ID Act requires states to issue driver’s licenses and
official identification cards containing, at a minimum, nine features to help
ensure accurate identification:
252 Id. at 211-12.
253 Greenberg, supra note 4, at 273.
254 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 67, at 1.
255 Id.
256 Id.  The test actually determines the presence of a Y chromosome, as opposed to con-
firming an XX chromosome assignment. See id.
257 Id. at 1-2.
258 Id. at 1.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 2.
261 See Olsen-Acre, supra note 250, at 217.
262 For a detailed discussion, see generally Jill Pilgrim et al., Far from the Finish Line:
Transsexualism and Athletic Competition, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
495 (2003).
263 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 and 49 U.S.C.).
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(1) the person’s full legal name. (2) the person’s date of birth. (3) the person’s gen-
der. (4) the person’s driver’s license or identification card number. (5) a digital pho-
tograph of the person. (6) the person’s address of principle residence. (7) the person’s
signature. (8) physical security features designed to prevent tampering, counterfeit-
ing, or duplication of the document for fraudulent purposes. (9) a common machine-
readable technology, with defined minimum data elements.264
The REAL ID Act also established minimum requirements for documenta-
tion for issuing an identification card, as well as mandates for states to create
databases of personal information for sharing information between states.265
Note that the REAL ID Act requires inclusion of a person’s “gender” and
not “sex.”  It will be up to the states to decide how gender is determined, as
they do now, with the result that gender will be considered synonymous with
sex, and difficult to change on an identification card.266
States can continue to issue non-REAL ID qualifying identification, but
non-complying documents issued after December 31, 2009,267 must be of an
alternative design, and must explicitly state that they cannot be accepted for
any federal identification purpose, such as for entry to federal buildings, or
even for boarding a plane.268  States that have not complied with the new law
by December 31, 2009, may seek a second waiver indicating that they want
more time to comply with the legislation.269  The deadline is an effort to
increase states’ compliance with the REAL ID program.270  Citizens born after
December 1, 1964, have until December 1, 2014, to get a new driver’s
264 Id. § 202(b).
265 Id. § 202(c), (d).  These documentation requirements will require more work for people
transitioning from one sex to another than this already onerous task requires. See Allen,
supra note 56, at 186.
266
“DHS will leave the determination of gender up to the States since different States have
different requirements concerning when, and under what circumstances, a transgendered
individual should be identified as another gender.”  Minimum Standards for Driver’s
Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 73
Fed. Reg. 5272, 5301 (Jan. 29, 2008) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 37).
267 See id. at 5272. See also Dep’t of Homeland Sec., REAL ID:  States Granted Exten-
sions, http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1204567770971.shtm (last visited Feb. 8,
2009) (noting that every state has been granted an initial extension).
268 See REAL ID Act § 202(d)(11); Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identifi-
cation Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. at 5274.
“[A] Federal agency may not accept, for any official purpose, a driver’s license or identifica-
tion card issued by a State to any person unless the State is meeting the requirements . . . .”
REAL ID Act § 202(a)(1).  Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff was quoted as
saying,
If a particular state were to say, ‘We opt out, we’re not going to participate at all,’ then the
law is very clear . . .  After May of this year, that state’s drivers’ licenses will no longer be
acceptable as a form of federal identification for getting on an airplane or getting into a federal
building.
Jay Levine, Real ID Act:  Showdown between Feds, State, CBS2CHICAGO, Jan. 11, 2008,
http://cbs2chicago.com/local/Real.ID.act.2.628190.html.  Note that the individual identifica-
tion cards of its citizens do not have to be REAL ID Act-compliant by December 31, 2008,
but the state must be in compliance with the Act on that date, or its citizens will not be able
to access federal buildings and airports. Id.
269 Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Fed-
eral Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. at 5272.
270 See id.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-2\NVJ204.txt unknown Seq: 33 21-MAY-09 10:29
400 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:368
license.271  Americans born before December 1, 1964, have until December 1,
2017.272  Residents of states not complying with the REAL ID Act have to use
a passport or another type of federal border-crossing card, or submit themselves
to a rigorous secondary screening at airport security to comply with federal
identification purposes.273
Diverse groups across the political spectrum oppose the REAL ID Act.
Some see it as an attempt to establish a national identification card, historically
a politically unpopular concept with Congress.274  Since the creation of the
individual social security number in 1936, there have been many efforts to
make one’s social security number a unique identifier, and the basis of a
national identification card, a concept adopted by many other countries.275
Those who support state sovereignty oppose the adoption of a national identifi-
cation card, criticizing its implementation as eroding states’ rights, expensive,
and ineffective.276
Although the city of San Francisco has recognized the benefits to some
sexual minorities of having gender- or sex-neutral identification cards, no state
has yet to adopt a gender-neutral driver’s license or identification card.  The
REAL ID Act precludes any state’s efforts to do so.277  At least one municipal-
ity has recognized the benefits to some sexual minorities of having gender- or
sex-neutral identification cards.278  States that may desire to create gender-neu-
tral driver’s licenses because of the problems they can cause for people who are
not easily categorized by gender, or who identify with a different gender or sex
than the one assigned at birth are precluded from doing so by the REAL ID
Act.  Advocates for transgender persons’ rights are also concerned about the
requirements of the Act to prove identity that will cause people transitioning, or
who have transitioned from one sex to another, to face new hurdles in acquiring
congruence among their various official identification cards and documents.279
271 Id.
272 Id. See also Justin Vellucci, REAL ID Shapes Up to Be a Real Headache, PITTSBURGH
TRIB.-REV., Jan. 14, 2008, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/
cityregion/s_547350.html (discussing the difficulties states are experiencing implementing
the REAL ID Act).
273 Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by Fed-
eral Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. at 5273; Levine, supra note 268.
274 See, e.g., Thiessen, supra note 10, at 507.
275 For a history of these efforts, see Debra Milberg, The National Identification Debate:
“Real ID” and Voter Identification, 3 I/S:  J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 443, 446-48
(2008).
276 Among other criticisms of the Act. Id. at 449-56.
277 San Francisco, as of January 15, 2009, issues identity cards for undocumented immi-
grants, which contains no category for gender. See Office of The County Clerk, SF City ID
Card, http://www.sfgov.org/site/countyclerk_index.asp?id=78261 (last visited Mar. 16,
2009).  Legal challenges to the program formerly caused the program to be put indefinitely
“on hold.”  Wyatt Buchanan, Mayor Puts the City’s Controversial ID Card Program On
Hold, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 4, 2008, at B1.
278 See infra note 306 and accompanying text.
279 For example, as set forth by the organization for Parent and Friends of Lesbians and
Gays (PFLAG):
The Real ID Act will increase discrimination and violence against our transgender loved
ones.  Transgender people need an ID that accurately reflects their current and updated name and
gender and, for safety reasons, information about a gender change must be kept private.  The
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Some documents that are problematic include social security cards, as well as
utility bills and photos which may be kept on file for up to a decade, further
complicating transitions from one sex or gender to another.280
Gender or sex appears on many identifying documents, such as driver’s
licenses, birth certificates, passports, etc.  Birth certificates are often used to
identify a person’s date of birth,281 but the sex category required on birth certif-
icates can be problematic for some sexual minorities, and the processes for
changing one’s sex on a birth certificate are non-uniform.282  A sex determina-
tion on a birth certificate that does not correspond with a person’s chosen sex or
gender can cause a multitude of problems, as a birth certificate is the first and
foundational document in establishing one’s identity.
B. Birth Certificates
Birth Certificates must usually be filled out within ten days after the birth
of a child.283  The medical attendant determines an infant’s sex at birth.284  Pro-
fessor Elizabeth Reilly’s well argued solution for the problem with gender
determination on birth certificates for intersexual persons, and for persons who
later choose to change their sex, along with myriad other related problems for
sexual minorities285 is unequivocal:  “[w]e must cease using the Birth Certifi-
cate to assign sex to a child.”286  Professor Reilly notes that birth certificates
are more likely to be used to prove a person’s age rather than their gender.287
Real ID Act puts up additional barriers to acquiring an ID that reflects a person’s new name and
it makes information about a person’s former name easier to discover, potentially outing trans-
gender people to whomever scans their ID.  When transgender people do not have updated infor-
mation on their ID, or when information about a gender change is made known, transgender
people are vulnerable to increased discrimination and even violence.
PFLAG: Parents, Families, & Friends of Lesbians and Gays, Advocacy & Issues:  Real ID
Act, http://community.pflag.org/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=753&srcid=210 (last
visited Feb. 16, 2009) (emphasis omitted).
280 See Allen, supra note 56, at 186.
281 For example, a birth certificate is one of many documents the State of Illinois will accept
in proving a person’s identity in their application for a driver’s license. See Cyber Drive Ill.,
Acceptable Identification, http://www.cyberdriveillinois.com/departments/drivers/drivers_
license/acceptable_id.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).  A number of documents, including
the birth certificate, are acceptable for proving a person’s date of birth, while other docu-
ments may be used to prove one’s residency, their signature, and their Social Security Num-
ber. Id.  Nowhere on the list, however, is a person required to prove their gender. See id.
282 See infra Part IV.B.
283 See Reilly, supra note 6, at 311.
284 The “[p]referred [s]ource” of the information listed in the CDC specification is from the
”[d]elivery record,” or the “[i]nfant’s medical record.” DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, BIRTH
EDIT SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE 2003 REVISION OF THE U.S. STANDARD CERTIFICATE OF
BIRTH, Item 3, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/FinalBirthSpecs3-
24-2005.pdf.  The determination of male or female, or “not yet determined,” is possible. Id.
It is made by a physician, hospital administrator or midwife, or, if no medical attendant,
another respondent.  Reilly, supra note 6, at 299 n.8.
285 Of course, not having a record of the sex of a person at birth would likely frighten many
people who may fear that two persons marrying may have been born the same sex. See
supra notes 231-45 and accompanying text (discussing Littleton v. Prang and M.T. v. J.T.).
286 Reilly, supra note 6, at 308.
287 Id. at 298 n.5.
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By not having a sex identifier on this foundational document, there would be no
earlier record of sex to correct.288
The standard birth certificate form has a blank for “not yet determined”
under “sex,” meant to be a temporary placeholder, but it must be changed to
male or female while the child is an infant.289  Note that this insistence on
completion is so rigid that a determination of male or female must be made
even if the child dies.290  By comparison, Professor Reilly notes that race is not
“assigned” at birth, and is a critical concept of self-identity, to be determined
by the individual.291
Changing the sex on your birth certificate is an onerous task, if it is at all
possible.  Although there have been attempts to make birth certificates uniform,
there is not much uniformity among the states on changes made to birth certifi-
cates.  Professor Spade notes that many states require proof of gender changing
surgery,292 though other states do not specifically require surgery.293  Three
states do not have any mechanism to change a birth certificate, including Ten-
nessee, which actually has a statute forbidding a change of sex on a birth certif-
icate.294  The requirement for surgery in many states also requires someone
seeking the change to first undergo a psychological evaluation to even qualify
for surgery.295
Birth certificates have not always been uniform in content, and, until rela-
tively recently, were not required in most states.  In 1902, Congress established
the Bureau of the Census as a permanent federal agency with the authority to
develop a uniform system for the registration of births.296  The Bureau’s objec-
tive was to develop and maintain a registration system that was uniform in law,
forms, procedures and statistical methodology.297  Although the first national
birth registration legislation was proposed as early as 1850, the Census Bureau
produced the first standard birth certificates in 1900.298  The Bureau also pro-
288 Professor Reilly is aware of the need for collecting vital statistics data, noting that other
information is collected at the time of birth that does not appear on the actual birth certifi-
cate, and argues that sex should be treated similarly. Id. at 318 & n.85.  For example, infor-
mation about an infant having certain diseases at birth is collected, but does not appear on
the child’s birth certificate. Id.
289 See id. at 322.
290 See id.
291 See id. at  324-25.  Taking full advantage of this freedom, Tiger Woods calls himself a
“Cablasian,” a delightful blend of Caucasian, Black and Asian ancestry.  Posting by G.H.
Brooks to Fox Sports Blogs, http://community.foxsports.com/blogs/DrMidnight/2006/05/06/
Earl_Woods_A_Father_First2 (May 6, 2006, 17:30 EST).
292 See Spade, supra note 67, at 16 n.3 (listing a number of state statutes requiring proof of
surgical procedures undergone for an individual to change sex).
293 See supra note 284.
294 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2006) (“The sex of an individual shall not be
changed on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.”).
295 See Spade, supra note 67, at 23-24.
296 See U.S. CENSUS OFFICE, ACT OF MARCH 6, 1902:  PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A PERMANENT CENSUS OFFICE (1902), available at http://www.census.gov/history/pdf/
Permanent_Census_Act_1902.pdf.
297 See DIV. OF VITAL STATISTICS, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, REPORT OF THE
PANEL TO EVALUATE THE U.S. STANDARD CERTIFICATES 9 (2000) [hereinafter REPORT OF
THE PANEL].
298 Id. at 1.
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duced a Standard Certificate of Death, as well as a Report of Fetal Death (for-
merly Stillbirth), a Standard Certificate of Marriage and Divorce or Annulment,
and a Standard Report of Induced Termination of Pregnancy.299  By 1933, all
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia participated in the birth registra-
tion system.300  Currently, the system is implemented in all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, the independent registration area of New York City,
Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands.301  Dropping a gender or sex identifier would not go against
centuries of tradition, but would go a long way toward reducing problems for
some sexual minorities.
In addition to creating problems for certain sexual minorities, inclusion of
sex or gender on birth certificates does not help with accurate identification.
As people often rely upon their birth certificate for obtaining other official doc-
uments, the inability to change a birth certificate may hamper efforts to change
other legal documents to make them consistent in gender or sex indicators. The
difficulty of changing a birth certificate creates problems for someone transi-
tioning from one sex to another, both from a practical and legal standpoint.302
C. Identification Technologies
Identification technology has advanced significantly since driver’s
licenses first required photographs.303  Personal identifiers that qualify as bio-
metrics, albeit primitive ones, include:  skin, hair and eye color, physical mark-
ings, gender, and facial hair.304  Of these attributes, only gender is required to
be included under the REAL ID Act.  What these attributes all have in common
is the ability to easily change or disguise them.  Although some of these bio-
metrics, such as height and weight, appear on state issued driver’s licenses, the
REAL ID Act does not require them on complying identification cards.  As any
of the above biometrics are subject to change or disguise, they should not be a
part of a law designed to improve the accuracy of identification cards.  Contact
lenses can instantly change your eye color.  People can add or lose weight, or
lie about it at the outset, as this requirement is usually self-reported.  Note that
race or skin color is not required under the REAL ID Act, ostensibly because
legal determinations should not be made based on those criteria.  Although it is
also a poor identifier, skin color could be considered superior to gender as an
299 See id.
300 See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TECHNI-
CAL APPENDIX FROM VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:  NATALITY, 1997, at 1
(1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/techap97.pdf.
301
“[T]he National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) is required to produce national vital
statistics by compiling data from the central vital records office in all of the 57 registration
areas.” REPORT OF THE PANEL, supra note 297, at 1.
302 In applying for certain governmental benefits, there might even be issues of fraud.
303 See generally Idaho Transp. Dep’t, Idaho’s Motor Vehicle History, http://www.itd.
idaho.gov/dmv/dmvhistory.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
304 See, e.g., Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards:  Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Issues, 56 FLA. L. REV. 697, 704-05 (2004).  Biometrics are human physical characteristics
that can be used to verify identification. See, e.g., Bridget Mallon, “Every Breath You Take,
Every Move You Make, I’ll be Watching You”:  The Use of Face Recognition Technology,
48 VILL. L. REV. 955, 957 (2003).
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identifier, as it is more difficult to change or disguise, but this would be politi-
cally unworkable, and rightfully so.
Gender and sex, as we have seen, can be changed, or even simply dis-
guised.  In practice, we rely on self-reported gender, and seldom do we need
verification.305  Gender is a poor biometric identifier, and requiring it under the
REAL ID Act serves only to preserve the normative view of sex to the detri-
ment of anyone who is gender variant.  A state could still decide to include
gender if it were dropped from the Act, just as many states still require height
and weight determinations, even though not forced to include them by the Act.
Although no state as of yet has dropped gender or sex from their driver’s
licenses and official identification cards, at least one jurisdiction has attempted
to issue an identification card that is gender neutral.306
More accurate biometrics includes fingerprints, retinal scans and DNA,307
which are not contemplated by the REAL ID Act.  If the purpose of the Act is
to ensure identity, these might be better alternatives.  The Act does require a
digital photograph, which may not be as helpful as might be expected in con-
firming a person’s identity.  When attempting to lessen the incidence of credit
card fraud, some companies began using credit cards that had a photo of the
card-holder.308  In a controlled study, it was discovered that people could not
make adequate identification determinations based upon the photos, neglected
to check, or were reticent to challenge the holder, even when the person knew
that they were being tested on compliance.309
However, that same digital photograph required by the REAL ID Act,
coupled with facial recognitions software, could be used to affirm identity
accurately.310  This technology has been used to scan large crowds in stadiums
to identify criminals, most notably at the Super Bowl in 2001.311  Although
these programs are usually accurate, their success has little or nothing to do
305 See Reilly, supra note 6, at 315.  People transitioning must be careful, however to
achieve congruence among all their official documents to avoid the appearance of fraud.
Fraud is often considered when transgender persons apply for a legal name change, although
it is not usually clarified what kind of fraud is suspected. See In re Eck, 584 A.2d 859, 860
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
306 San Francisco purposely did not require a gender or sex requirement in their identifica-
tion cards available for undocumented immigrants. See supra note 277.
307 See Steinbock, supra note 304, at 705.
308 See Graham Pike et al., The Psychology of Human Face Recognition, 18 IEE COLLO-
QUIUM ON VISUAL BIOMETRICS 11/1, 11/1 (2000) (London).
309 See id. at 11/2 to /3.
310 Bridget Mallon offers the following, brief discussion of face recognition software:
Face recognition technology works by creating a “map” of the face from a photograph that a
surveillance camera takes.  Each face has eighty distinctive points that are recorded from the
photograph.  Once these distinctive points are mapped, they are translated into a unique set of
numbers, using a sophisticated algorithm, from which a face map is created.  Once this map is
created, it is scanned through a database of stored face maps.  Only fourteen to twenty-two points
need to line up in order to make a match.  If the computer program signals a match, the original
photograph and the photograph it was matched with are displayed side by side on a screen.
Then, whoever is monitoring the screens, either police or security, decides whether or not the
faces are actually a match.
Mallon, supra note 304, at 958-59 (footnotes omitted).
311 Id. at 963.
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with gender or sex.  Facial recognition systems are designed to adjust for
changes of a person’s age, facial hair or weight.312
Other available technologies that are more accurate than primitive biomet-
rics include radio frequency identification technology (RFID),313 which can
identify objects at a distance based on RFID tags embedded in identification
form.314  Proposals have been made to include RFID tags in all passports and
driver’s licenses.315  The short range of the technology requires that the RFID
tags be read in close proximity, for readers or scanners may allay some privacy
concerns, though they have potential to be linked with long range tracking tech-
nologies like global positioning systems (GPS).316  This potential makes RFID
unlikely to be very popular with people concerned with their privacy, as access
to their identity information could occur involuntarily.317
With the availability of all of these other methods for ensuring the accu-
racy of identification, requiring gender is out of place with the new enhanced
security identification cards required under the Act.  Gender is of limited, if
any, value as an identifier, but can cause significant mischief to sexual minori-
ties, and therefore, has no place in identification cards’ federal minimal require-
ments to ensure accuracy.  Congress should delete gender from the REAL ID
Act’s minimal requirements for a federally compliant identification card.
V. CONCLUSION
Determining a person’s gender or sex can be a difficult calculus when all
the medical determinants of sex do not align in a person.  Although intersex
persons are thought to be a small fraction of our population, thanks to examina-
tion at increasingly technologically advanced levels, it is apparent that a true
binary does not exist between the sexes.  Intersexual, transsexual, and other
transgender people have incongruence of the medically understood sex identifi-
ers, and possibly, many other people who have had no reason to examine their
DNA (at least not yet).
What is undeniable is that gender and sex are not truly binaries, and laws
treating them as such are antiquated.  Social and legal conventions have fol-
lowed our medical discoveries in the past, and must continue to evolve to
reflect the world as we better understand it.  Knowing the fallacy of sex and
gender binaries, requiring a gender identifier as a matter of federal law on all
state issued identification cards is hardly a rational approach to ensuring the
accurate identification of people in an effort to thwart future terrorist threats.
The requirement that gender be an identifier on identification cards should be
eliminated from the REAL ID Act to allow states the freedom to delete this
inaccurate and problematic biometric from their official identification cards.
312 Id. at 961.
313 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg & Douglas B. Burda, The Frontiers of Privacy Law:
Technology Marches On, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW:  EVOLVING
LAWS AND PRACTICES IN A SECURITY-DRIVEN WORLD (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 8966, 2006), WL 866 PLI/PAT 481, 487.
314 See, e.g., id.
315 See, e.g., id. at 489.
316 See, e.g., id. at 489-90.
317 See, e.g., id. at 495.
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This reform would be meaningless if states do not also amend their identi-
fication card requirements to delete a gender identifier from their official iden-
tification cards.  States should make genderless identification cards available to
citizens now to avoid most of the harsh effects of inclusion of a gender identi-
fier on certain sexual minorities.  These identification cards would be valid for
most uses, except for federal purposes (such as entry to federal property and
airports). Repeal or amendment of the REAL ID Act would make those
genderless identification cards as “real” as any other official identification card.
